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Intense debate in both state and federal governments has fo-
cused on the question: should government restrict insurers' use
of classifications' such as sex or zip codes, in deciding whom to
insure, how much to charge, and what coverage to offer? Two
perspectives, the traditional fair discrimination approach, taken
by most insurers and insurance regulators, and the antidis-
crimination perspective, grounded in civil rights law concepts,
have dominated the controversy.' Regrettably, the former per-
spective has received undue deference4 and the latter, while use-
ful, obscures other important considerations for regulation of in-
surance classification. Two additional perspectives must be
added to the debate to ensure that sound public policy choices
are made.6
One overlooked perspective is an appreciation that insurance
is a necessity for most Americans. Public choices have height-
ened that necessity while looking to the private insurance sys-
tem to meet it. As a result, government should assume greater
responsibility for selection of classifications, both from a concern
for their perceived legitimacy and because of their relation to
insurance availability.
The second overlooked perspective is an understanding that a
significant form of competition in the insurance market, selec-
tion competition, possesses limited utility from both the public
policy and the free market viewpoints. Selection competition,
sellers competing through the choice of buyers for the product,
deflects public attention and competitive pressure on insurers
away from forms of competition that might achieve the ends for
2. Underwriters and market strategists are more likely than actuaries to be responsi-
ble for the classifications this Article criticizes, although actuaries commonly are per-
ceived to be responsible. See infra note 373.
3. See infra notes 41-110 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 111-249 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 93-103, 347-69 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 250-346 and accompanying text.
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which competition is revered: reduced overhead, improved ser-
vice, and innovative products of high quality. Today's relatively
unfettered selection competition emphasizes deciding who
should not be sold insurance, with serious consequences for per-
ceived fairness and availability, while allowing the perpetuation
of numerous market inefficiencies.
The proposal that Congress has considered most actively takes
an antidiscrimination approach to classification reform.7 Those
raising fair discrimination and superficial pro-competition argu-
ments staunchly oppose this proposal. Much of the debate in the
states has been along similar lines. This debate's limited param-
eters have obscured consideration of three areas in which action
is needed: acceptance of government responsibility for the crite-
ria upon which classifications should be based, availability of in-
surance coverage, and the encouragement of desirable
competition.
Government responsibility for classification and concern for
availability should result from the critical place insurance plays
in today's society. The people of the United States comprise
about five percent of the world's population8 but buy almost half
of the private insurance sold in the world.9 In 1983, American
expenditures on insurance amounted to almost twelve percent of
the nation's disposable income. 10
For a family with even modest assets to protect, the personal
lines of insurance are necessities. Personal lines are those that
individuals usually carry: automobile, homeowner's or renter's,
health, life, and disability insurance. An automobile accident or
an injury in one's home can lead to expensive litigation with ex-
pensive consequences. Therefore, liability coverage in automo-
bile and homeowner's policies, through which the insurer under-
takes to provide the defense and pay the cost of damage awards
up to policy limits, has become a necessity for many Americans.
7. S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 372]; H.R. 100, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 100]. For further discussion, see infra
notes 59-62 and accompanying text. For citation to previous introductions of these bills,
see infra note 59.
8. In 1983, the United States' population was about 234,193,000 while the world's
population was about 4,722,000,000. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 856, 857 (1984).
9. Figures for 1979 from the North American Reinsurance Corporation show that the
United States pays 44.7% of the world's insurance premiums (excluding government
programs). A. TOBIAS, THE INVisIBLE BANKERS 22 (1982).
10. Competition in the Insurance Industry: Oversight Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1984) (testimony of Robert Hunter, National Insurance Consumer
Organization) [hereinafter cited as House Oversight Hearings].
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Automobile insurance is a condition of registering a car in about
half the states. 1 Lenders require physical damage insurance as a
condition for financing the purchase of a vehicle. Obtaining a
home mortgage requires the fire and casualty coverages of home
owner's insurance." Even those who own their homes free of
debt often would lack personal savings sufficient to repair exten-
sive fire or storm damage. Homeowners with reachable assets,
like car owners, must fear the economic consequences of a per-
sonal injury suit.
Technological advances have increased vastly the medical pro-
fession's capacity to heal and prolong life, but technology is ex-
pensive. The costs of both basic medical care and extraordinary
procedures have spiralled in recent years." A patchwork of fed-
eral programs provides publicly funded medical care or health
insurance to some Americans, primarily poor people, the aged,
Native Americans, the military, and veterans."' Other Americans
must look to private health insurance to assure access to quality
medical care and to protect against the financial catastrophe
that could result from serious illness.
Social security benefits for dependents of a deceased or dis-
abled worker are modest and subject to various restrictions. 5
11. In 1979, the General Accounting Office reported that 25 states required such in-
surance. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IssuEs AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE
REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 75 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
For other inventories of such legal requirements, see the authorities cited by Austin, The
Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 520 n.9 (1983).
12. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106,
1111 (S.D. Ohio 1979); MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES: A REPORT BY THE
PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS 1 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as HUGHES PANEL REPORT] (calling insurance the "cornerstone of
credit").
13. See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
14. The major programs reaching poor people are Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p
(1982) and the Public Health Service, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300z-10 (1982). Older people and
social security disability recipients can purchase Medicare insurance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395xx (1982). The Indian Health Service provides care for many Native Americans. 25
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1680 (1982). Health care is provided for those on active duty by the vari-
ous military services. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1092 (1982). Veterans receive some care through
the Veteran's Administration. 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-664 (1982). Most of these programs are
subject to qualifying requirements and limits on coverage. Some other programs also
provide federally funded medical care or insurance, such as care for inmates in federal
institutions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4005, 4082, 4251 (1982). The federal government contributes to
the cost of health insurance for federal civilian employees in the same manner as many
other employers. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1982).
15. For a worker and his dependents or survivors to qualify for social security disabil-
ity benefits, he must be unable to engage in any "substantial gainful activity" because of
an impairment that is expected to result in death or to last at least twelve months. 42
U.S.C. § 423(1)(A) (1982). A different standard applies to blind workers. 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(B) (1982). This means that a worker who can perform some job, even a much
[VOL. 19:2
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Therefore, Americans at or above the middle-income level must
consider purchasing life and disability insurance to meet the
needs of their families.
Today's mobile, urban society does not provide the same kin-
ship and community support networks that once met some of
these insurance needs.16 Even if these ties still were strong, the
expense and complexity of the safety net required for those who
wish to preserve assets and a life style above the poverty line
rarely could be maintained by extended family and community
help alone. Some nations have opted for government-adminis-
tered programs to meet similar needs of their citizens,1 7 but
American public policy generally has relied on private insurance
carriers to provide individual financial security. 18
Private carriers have considerable discretion regarding how
various insurance coverages and their costs will be distributed
among the population. How much one pays, what coverage one
less remunerative one than his previous one, cannot qualify. Also, there is no coverage
for disabilities that may last less than a year, although such a disability may result in
substantial loss of income not covered by employer-paid sick leave.
Another restriction, beginning April 1985, is that children 18 or over of deceased par-
ents cannot continue to receive social security benefits while attending post-secondary
school. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 412,
at 61 (1984). Thus, the worker who wishes to ensure adequate income for a child's college
or vocational training must look to savings or life insurance.
Assume a worker whose monthly earnings averaged $36,744 per year over his working
lifetime as adjusted for changes in the cost of living by the Social Security Administra-
tion. The maximum benefit for his family is $18,645.60 per year upon his death or retire-
ment, or $15,987.60 upon his disability. These figures are calculated from data in STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., BACKGROUND MATmAL AND
DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 39
(Table 15) (Comm. Print 1984). Lower earnings would mean proportionately lower
benefits.
16. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 480 (1961); Gardner, Insurance and the
Anti-Trust Laws-A Problem in Synthesis, 61 HARV. L. REV. 246, 273 (1948). R. GRANT,
INSURANCE REFORM: CONSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 6 (1979), attributes the
gargantuan growth of the insurance industry after the Civil War to the move from the
"self sufficiency of the agrarian-based extended-family unit" to urban workers dependent
on the wage system.
17. Some countries have comprehensive health insurance schemes that reach all citi-
zens. See S. KAMERMAN & A. KAHN, ESSAYS ON INCOME TRANSFERS AND RELATED PRO-
GRAMS IN EIGHT COUNTRIES (1983) for descriptions of health programs in Sweden (4-6),
France (86-88), and Canada (468-88). See also Soderstom, The Canadian Experience, 33
AcAD. POL. SCI. PROC. 224 (1980) for more detail on the Canadian system.
Some nations rely more heavily on government programs in compensating automobile
accident victims. See infra note 264 and accompanying text. A few American states con-
sidered government-sponsored programs in fire and life in the early twentieth century
but ultimately opted for private insurance schemes. See infra notes 278-83 and 297-303
and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 264-303 and accompanying text.
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can purchase, and whether one can buy insurance at all are de-
termined in large part by how an individual is classified by in-
surers. This Article refers to these choices as the rating, cover-
age, and underwriting decisions.19
Insurers have guarded jealously their discretion to make clas-
sification decisions.2 0 They generally have been successful in this
regard, but their exercise of this discretion has not been without
controversy.
Many commentators have claimed that territorial rating, usu-
ally based on zip code of residence, is a disguised form of racial
discrimination that works to the detriment of blacks in property
and automobile insurance. 21 They also have charged that racial
19. Classification refers to treating an individual as a member of a class based on an
individual trait such as gender, residential zip code, driving record, history of cancer, and
so forth. For a review of commonly used classifications, see generally R. HOLTOM, RE-
STRAINTS ON UNDERWRITING (1979). Rating is the process of transforming classifications
into prices for insurance. An example of rating is charging drivers under age 25 higher
rates than older drivers. Id. at 25-26. Rating also includes the process of defining the
basic charge for insurance. Issues in setting base rates, however, are not of concern in
this Article.
Classification may play a role in coverage as well as in rating and underwriting. In the
past, for example, disability coverage often required longer waiting periods for women
than men and then provided them with lower benefits. See, e.g., Stern v. Mass. Indem. &
Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 1973 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp.
1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, in part, remanded sub nom. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.), modified, 485 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
Underwriting refers to the decision whether to offer insurance to an individual at all as
when individuals with more than a specified number of traffic violations are refused auto
insurance. See R. HOLTOM, supra note 19, at 5-7, 12-15. Underwriting guidelines may be
adopted formally by companies and exist in formal manuals, or they may be lists of
unacceptable risks passed informally from underwriter to underwriter. To insurers, the
term underwriting may refer also to setting policy conditions (here referred to as the
"coverage decision") and assignment of premiums (here referred to as "rating"). See
Comment, Gender Classifications in the Insurance Industry, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1381,
1383 n.13 (1975), which develops definitions similar to those used in this Article.
Classification also may play a role in marketing. Insurers may direct their advertising
at a particular segment of the population and choose agents who are likely to sell only to
particular groups. For example, former Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Herbert
Denenberg has said that many insurers avoid non-white markets. He cites as support an
American Academy of Actuaries study. Insurance Competition Improvement Act: Hear-
ings on S. 2474 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 2474,1; see also Lamel, State Regulation of the Insur-
ance Industry, 1978 INs. L.J. 336 (containing similar comments of a Deputy New York
Insurance Commissioner).
20. One commentator who made an extensive study of reform efforts in property in-
surance has referred to underwriting prerogative as "an important political symbol."
Works, Whatever's Fair-Adequacy, Equity and the Underwriting Prerogative in Prop-
erty Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 479 (1977).
21. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106
(S.D. Ohio 1979). For five studies of alleged insurance redlining, see Rights and Reme-
dies of Insurance Policyholders, Part 1: Discrimination by Property and Casualty In-
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classification still is used covertly in some underwriting decisions
through means other than territorial rating.2 Controversies have
erupted periodically with regard to the role of territory, age, and
gender in insurer decisions in automobile insurance." Young
men in urban areas, who usually pay more for automobile insur-
ance than their older, female, or suburban counterparts, have ar-
gued that high rates effectively render insurance unavailable to
them. 4 Advocates for physically and mentally impaired people
have convinced some state legislatures to restrict insurer discre-
tion with regard to such impairments generally or with regard to
a specific disability. 5 Much of the controversy about classifica-
tion in the last two decades has focused on gender classifica-
tion.2 6 Automobile classification schemes have been criticized for
surance Companies: The Fairness in the Coverage and Cost of Insurance: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-351, 352-409, 410-51, 452-87, 634-748
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property
and Casualty Ins.].
22. See, e.g., Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp.
112 (D. Mass. 1972) (concerning a fraternal benefits association's refusal of a black mem-
ber when membership was necessary to buy life insurance).
23. Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins.,
supra note 21, at 8-12.
24. Id. at 81. The General Accounting Office contrasts a 24-year-old male driver with
no accidents living in East Boston who would have to pay $2,512 for car insurance on a
three-year-old Chevrolet Malibu with an elderly resident of Deerfield, Massachusetts
who would pay $160 for the same car and same coverages even if the Deerfield man had
two accidents in the previous year. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 104.
25. Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classi-
fication, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 794 (1976); see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
26. Five sets of congressional hearings have been held on a bill introduced by Sena-
tors Hatfield and Packwood and Representative Dingell that would prohibit classifica-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Most of the~testimony
from the opponents and proponents has focused on gender classification. See, e.g., Fair
Insurance Practices Act: Hearings on S. 372 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on S. 372]; Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearings on S. 2204 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 2204]; Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act:
Hearings on S. 2477 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings on S. 2477]; Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1983: Hearings on
H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited
as House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong.]; Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of
1981: Hearings on H.R. 100 before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and
Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R. 100, 97th Cong.]. See cases cited infra note
57. At the most recent of these hearings, Senator Packwood commented, "although there
are five categories . . . [covered by the bill] . . . only the one of sex seems to bother the
companies." Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra, at 323.
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favoring those with higher socio-economic status.21 Underwriting
decisions about occupations and life styles have been attacked as
based on stereotypes and irrational prejudices.2"
Much of the academic commentary on classification has fo-
cused on gender and the questions before the Supreme Court in
City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Man-
hart29 and Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.30 These
cases presented the issue of whether federal employment dis-
crimination law bans gender classification in employer-spon-
sored fringe benefits and whether banning such classification is
sound policy. Commentary has concentrated on the specific clas-
sification and line of insurance considered in those cases, gender
classification in annuities, or somewhat more generally on gen-
der classification in the lines of insurance commonly sponsored
by employers, these being life, health, and disability insurance
as well as pensions and annuities."' Other writers on classifica-
27. Austin, supra note 11, at 534-48; see also Order of the New Jersey Insurance
Commissioner, Apr. 9, 1981, reprinted in House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra
note 26, at 1064-65 [hereinafter cited as N.J. Order, with page cites to House Hearings
on H.R. 100, 98th Cong.].
28. Excerpts from the Homeowners Insurance Underwriting Manual of the Continen-
tal Insurance Cos., reprinted in Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Prop-
erty and Casualty Ins., supra note 21, at 89-93. Included in the list of occupations con-
sidered to have a higher than average frequency of loss were: antique dealer, professional
athlete, actors and actresses, junk and secondhand dealers, and waiters and waitresses.
Id. Excerpts from the Hartford Personal Lines Underwriting Manual, reprinted in id., at
728-36, contain similar material with statements on considerations such as "Itihe psy-
chological makeup of a person likely to be drawn to this occupation, e.g., a banker versus
a carnival employee." See also Statement of Senator Metzenbaum, 126 CONG. REc. 6529
(1980) (criticizing the classification practices with examples from his subcommittee's
hearings).
29. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
30. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
31. Most notable in the comment spawned by City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), is one of the longest running dialogues in law
review history, a septology spawned by the debate between Professors Kimball and Ben-
ston, on the one hand, and Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues, on the other: Kim-
ball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 83 [herein-
after cited as Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination]; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock &
Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and De-
mographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brilmayer, Sex
Discrimination]; Kimball, Reprise on Manhart, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 915;
Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination as "Actuarial Equality" A Rejoinder to Kim-
ball, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 221; Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimi-
nation in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CI. L. REV. 489 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Benston, Economics of Gender Discrimination]; Brilmayer, Laycock
& Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to
Professor Benston, 50 U. CHL L. Rav. 222 (1983); Benston, Discrimination and Economic
Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits: A Clarification of Issues and a Response to
Professors Brilmayer, Laycock, and Sullivan, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 250 (1983).
See also Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions: Manhart's Holding v.
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tion also have tended to limit themselves to specific classifica-
tions in the context of particular lines of insurance.32 With a few
important exceptions,3" commmentary has focused on whether
Manhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1241 (1978); Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and
the Problem of Sex Classification in Pension Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (1974);
Gold, Of Giving and Taking: Applications and Implications of City of Los Angeles, De-
partment of Water and Power v. Manhart, 65 VA. L. REV. 663 (1979); Hager & Zim-
pleman, The Norris Decision, Its Implications and Applications, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913
(1983); Jacobs, The Manhart Case: Sex-Based Differentials and the Application of Title
VII to Pensions, 31 LAB. L.J. 232 (1980); Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective:
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J.
1 (1979); Lines, Sex-Based Fringe Benefits-Annuities and Life Insurance, 16 J. FAM. L.
489 (1977); Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199
(1979); Note, Title VII and the TIAA-CREF Annuity System: An Analysis of the Spirt
and Wayne State Decisions, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1230 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note,
TIAA-CREF Annuity System]; Note, Title VII's Applicability to Arizona's Deferred
Compensation Plan, 24 ARiz. L. REV. 1032 (1982); Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-
based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REV. 624 (1973); Note, Title VII and the McCarran
Act: Sex Discrimination in Retirement Benefits by Third-Party Insurers, 68 GEo. L.J.
1285 (1980); Note, Norris v. Arizona: A Move Toward Unisex Insurance, 45 LA L. REV.
149 (1984); Note, The Premiums on Longer Life: Gender Based Pension Benefits Vio-
late Civil Rights Act, 13 STETSON L. REV. 673 (1984); Note, Equal Protection, Title VII,
and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 13 TULSA L.J. 338 (1977); Note, Gender-Based Deter-
mination of Retirement Benefits: Arizona v. Norris, 19 TULSA L.J. 755 (1984); Note, Dis-
crimination in Insurance: The Unisex Issue, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 78 (1984); Note, Sex
Discrimination-Pensions-The Court Takes a Stand: Arizona v. Norris, 30 WAYNE L.
REV. 1329 (1984); Note, Sex Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits, 17 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 109 (1975); Note, Challenges to Sex Based Mortality Tables in Insurance
and Pensions, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (1980); Comment, Gender Classifications in
the Insurance Industry, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1381 (1975); Comment, An Additional Ex-
pense in the Quest for Equality: A Comment on Arizona v. Norris, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV.
671 (1984); Comment, Sex Stereotyping and Statistics-Equality in an Insurance Con-
text, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 137 (1983).
32. See, e.g., Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16
COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1980) (commenting on territorial classification in property/
casualty insurance); De Wolfe, Squires & De Wolfe, Civil Rights Implications of Insur-
ance Redlining, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 315 (1980) (same); Note, Insurance Redlining and
Fair Housing: The Lost Opportunity of Mackey V. Nationwide Insurance Company, 34
CATH. U.L. REV. 563 (1985) (same); Comment, Application of Title VIII to Insurance
Redlining, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 472 (1980) (same); Abramoff, Rating the Rating Schemes:
Application of Constitutional Equal Protection Principles to Automobile Insurance
Practices, 9 CAP. UL. REV. 683 (1980) (concerning gender classification in automobile
insurance); Kesner, Auto Insurance Rating: A Question of Equal Protection, 32 FED'N
INS. COUNS. Q. 165 (1982) (same). A recent antidiscrimination Article looks at the gender
classificaton debate across the various lines of personal insurance. Jerry & Mansfield,
Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another Perspective, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 329 (1985).
33. The author acknowledges an intellectual debt to four important Articles intro-
ducing other insights. The first is Austin, supra note 11, which is a conceptual critique of
the classification debate from a Critical Legal Studies perspective. Professor Austin ar-
gues that the classification schemes commonly used in automobile and property insur-
ance reflect and reinforce the status hierarchy of society. Id. at 543-48. That analysis is
drawn upon here as part of the critique of the claim that traditional fair discrimination
is a neutral, scientific enterprise with great fairness to the public. See infra notes 138-48
and accompanying text.
Critical Legal Studies theorists generally reject approaches to reform that involve gov-
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particular classifications should be forbidden from an antidis-
crimination perspective."' This Article takes a broader, concep-
tual approach, looking across classifications and lines of
insurance.
This Article classifies most of the public debate about classifi-
cation as coming from one of two perspectives labeled tradi-
tional fair discrimination"5  and antidiscrimina-
eminent regulation because they favor solutions evolving from "'organic groups' . . .
characterized by face-to-face co-existence and by multipurpose organization." Id. at 581;
see authority cited in n.372. See generally Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1984) (presenting the general approach of Critical Legal Studies). These
groups have voluntary membership and are free from domination. Austin, supra note 11,
at 581. With regard to the classification controversy in property insurance, it is proposed
that such groups could engage "in important economic and social tasks relevant to the
control of risks and the provision of support and resources for the victims of accidents
and losses." Id. The example cited is municipal fire or property insurance: a local juris-
diction would market group homeowner's insurance to residents through a master policy
written by a private carrier, with safety and maintenance inspections conducted by local
fire fighting personnel. Id. at 582. There probably are other examples of voluntary groups
that might provide insurance in a manner more desirable than that afforded by present
classification schemes, but the provision of insurance through these groups is likely to be
limited.
The second Article is Kemp, Insurance and Competition, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 547 (1981),
which focuses on the unique features of competition in the insurance market, including
their interplay with classification. The two other Articles are Underwood, Law and the
Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judg-
ment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979), which considers insurance classification as one case rais-
ing issues of legitimacy in public decisions based on statistical prediction, and Works,
supra note 20, which emphasizes the limits of the antidiscrimination perspective and the
manner in which it can obscure availability issues.
Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REv. 403
(1985), appeared recently. Although this author has some differences with Professor
Abraham, he provides a most useful and lucid attempt to bring conceptual and theoreti-
cal discipline to the classification debate.
Law and Economics scholars have entered the debate as well. See Professor Benston's
Articles cited supra note 31. Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues note correctly that
Professor Benston's work, while cast in Law and Economics terms, does not differ signifi-
cantly in perspective from that of Professor Kimball who argues the "traditional fair
discrimination" perspective. See Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 31,
and infra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text discussing the work; Brilmayer, Laycock
& Sullivan, supra note 31, at 223.
34. The Articles by Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues, supra note 31, probably
contain the most influential development of the antidiscrimination perspective.
35. The term "traditional" excludes a few state insurance commissioners who have
introduced other values, including some shared by the antidiscrimination perspective,
into classification reform without abandoning the rhetoric of fair discrimination. Florida,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania insurance
commissioners all have banned sex as well as some other classifications in automobile
insurance. See supra note 27 (N.J. order) & infra note 149 (Mass. order). Courts over-
turned the Florida, Louisiana, and North Carolina rulings. Dep't of Ins. v. Insurance
Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416
(Fla. 1984); Insurance Servs. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 382 So. 2d 1391 (La. 1979); State ex, rel. Commissioner of Ins. v.
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tion.3e Proponents of the status quo in classification and its reg-
ulation justify that status quo as fair discrimination. They argue
that fair discrimination is both desirable and a reflection of a
long-standing public policy judgment embodied in state law. 7
Part I finds the assertion that fair discrimination is fair wanting
in theory and even more deficient in practice, and rejects the
contention that state law reflects a requirement or even a judg-
ment about the wisdom of this approach.
Part I develops two alternative perspectives that should re-
ceive prominence in the classification debate: the vital impor-
tance of the personal lines of insurance to many Americans and
the way competition actually functions in the insurance market.
These perspectives provide additional bases of support for the
ban of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin classification
advocated by the antidiscriminators. They also expose the limits
of antidiscrimination as a single perspective on classification
reform.
Part II proposes three objectives for classification regulation:
perceived fairness of the system and legitimacy of classifications
used; promotion of overall loss control; and encouragement of
price and service competition. The legislative initiatives de-
scribed in Part III address these objectives.
The initiatives recommended are in three areas that have not
been included in the legislative proposals actively considered.
The first legislative proposal would judge all classifications
against articulated standards.3 8 The second initiative is a study
of the ability of individuals to buy insurance coverage to see who
cannot get insurance because it is too expensive. This study
would provide the data necessary to consider whether govern-
North Carolina Automobile Rate Admin. Office, 23 N.C. App. 475, 209 S.E.2d 411 (1974),
cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 219 (1975). North Carolina later banned sex classi-
fication in automobile insurance by statute as it has been banned in four other states.
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. The failure of the New Jersey and Wyo-
ming attempts are discussed in Austin, supra note 11, at 528-30. For discussion of the
court decisions upholding the Pennsylvania decision, see infra notes 223-26, 241-42, and
accompanying text. Because unfair discrimination statutes were the authority for their
action, commissioners could not abandon fair discrimination rhetoric.
36. Any attempt to place the views of diverse scholars, regulators, legislators, and
advocates into categories provides ample ground for disagreement and alternative formu-
lations. Another conceptualization of the classification debate characterizes the positions
regarding automobile and property insurance as those "of a competitive market regu-
lated pursuant to a widespread consensus that promotes individual mobility," called the
"individualist mode," and those "of a market controlled by social welfare considerations
determined by a political process that is responsive to intergroup unity and intergroup
conflict," labeled the "collectivist mode." Austin, supra note 11, at 549.
37. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 395-404 and accompanying text.
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ment intervention to broaden availability is warranted for a par-
ticular coverage and what method of intervention would be
best.39 The third recommendation is the need for legislation to
encourage desirable forms of competition in the insurance mar-
ket, the most important being provision of readily available and
understandable consumer information.40 Public debate in which
only the fair discrimination and antidiscrimination perspectives
are recognized obscures the need for these legislative proposals.
I. PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN INSURANCE
CLASSIFICATION
Most classification reforms that have taken place or have been
proposed have been from an antidiscrimination perspective.
This Part outlines such judicial and legislative reforms.
The status quo is termed here as traditional fair discrimina-
tion. The argument that it is fair to the public and required, or
urged, by the history of state unfair discrimination laws or their
judicial interpretation is challenged.
Two alternative perspectives to classification are presented.
First, each of the personal lines of insurance is a necessity for
many Americans. Society has chosen to meet this need through
private insurers. From those facts should flow a concern for the
perceived legitimacy of classifications used and insurance
availability.
Second, competition in the insurance market often is not the
price and service competition so revered. Classification itself be-
comes a form of competition that does not produce the same
beneficial results. Complex products, lack of useful information
about the multiplicity of products, and the possibility for agents
to act in their own economic interest rather than that of con-
sumers all impede competition reducing price and encouraging
better service. Classification restriction may enhance desirable
competition, and other measures to enhance such competition
should be taken as well.
A. Dominant Perspectives in the Classification Debate
Most insurers and insurance regulators, as well as some schol-
39. See infra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 407-14 and accompanying text.
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ars, argue that the goal of insurance classification should be fair
discrimination. In the words of a distinguished academic propo-
nent of this view, insurers should seek "to measure as accurately
as is practicable the burden shifted to the insurance fund by the
policyholder and to charge exactly for it, no more and no less.
To do so is "fair" discrimination . . . . Not to do so is unfair
discrimination."41
Some assert that the traditional fair discrimination perspec-
tive is fair because each insured pays according to what he re-
ceives rather than being subsidized by others.42 The perspective
also is said to be consistent with the mandate of state unfair
discrimination statutes, thus reflecting a long-standing public
policy judgment.
3
The antidiscrimination perspective rejects the traditional fair
discrimination approach from a perspective grounded in civil
rights law concepts. 44 This view opposes the use of certain classi-
fications, particularly those restricted by civil rights laws gov-
erning other activities or enterprises.
Insurers' discretion to practice traditional fair discrimination
in their classification of insureds has been circumscribed to a
considerable degree by the antidiscrimination perspective. The
Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart45 and Arizona Governing Committee v. Nor-
ris"e held that if an employer sponsors a fringe benefit plan, v
the plan must not treat employees differently with regard to cost
or benefits on the basis of any classification forbidden by Title
41. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 105; see also Bailey,
Hutchison & Narber, supra note 25, at 781-82; Gerber, The Economic and Actuarial
Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10 FORUM 1205, 1207 (1975) (espousing the same
view).
42. See Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 215 (testimony of John Filer,
Chairman, Aetna Life and Casualty).
43. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 105.
44. See supra notes 31-32. The best statement of the antidiscrimination perspective
is Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination, supra note 31.
45. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
46. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
47. The employer need not contribute funds to fall within the ambit of Norris. It was
considered sufficient there that Arizona invited insurance companies to submit bids, se-
lected the companies who would participate, entered into contracts governing the benefit
terms, gave employers time off to attend meetings to learn about benefit options, limited
the employee's choice of plans to those selected by the state, and deducted and for-
warded the payroll contributions. 463 U.S. at 1075-79, 1088-89 (1983). Hager & Zim-
pleman, supra note 31, at 932-33 (predicts extensive litigation on the requisite degree of
employer involvement and lists criteria authors believe relevant to determine whether
Norris applies).
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,48 namely, race, color, reli-
gion, sex, and national origin.49 In so doing, the Court rejected
the argument that sex-segregated tables should be permitted be-
cause they accurately reflect differences in longevity: " 'Even a
true generalization about [a] class' cannot justify class-based
treatment."' 0
Because Title VII addresses only employment discrimination,
Norris and Manhart extend only to employer-sponsored insur-
ance plans. Nevertheless, these cases will have a considerable
impact on the annuity, health, disability, and life insurance in-
dustries generally because these coverages largely are provided
by employers on a group basis. 5 On the other hand, Norris and
Manhart probably will have little direct effect on homeowner's
or automobile insurance because there is little employer-spon-
sored group coverage in these lines.
52
Race or color classification in insurance that is not employer-
sponsored might be reached by the Civil Rights Acts of 186653
and 1870." One district court has held55 that the racial impact
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
49. Manhart concerned retirement benefits from a state-run pension plan with no
private carrier involved. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Norris concerned a deferred compensation
plan that provided annuities under terms negotiated with private carriers. 463 U.S. 1073
(1983). Both schemes were found to be "compensation," "terms," or "conditions" of em-
ployment as to which there could be no discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). Under these two decisions, any
employer-sponsored insurance benefit would fall within the requirements and prohibi-
tions of Title VII.
50. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1084-85 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
51. For example, the President of the American Academy of Actuaries has testified
that 85% of private hospital/medical insurance issued to those under 65 is on a group
basis. Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 290. See Hager & Zimpleman, supra
note 31, at 940-42, on Norris's application to fringe benefits other than pensions and
annuities.
52. Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 290.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) guarantees the right to all citizens that is "enjoyed by
white citizens .. . [to] purchase . . . personal property." Sims v. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972), held § 1982 applicable to insurance.
Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974), reached the
same conclusion in a case concerning insurance rating for Native Americans. See also
dictum in Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984), which denied
standing to an insurance agent to challenge alleged discriminatory practices but indi-
cated that black insurance applicants who claimed discrimination would be able to sue
under §§ 1981 and 1982.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) guarantees to all persons in the United States the rights
enjoyed by white citizens "to make and enforce contracts." See Sims v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112, 114-15 (D. Mass. 1972); Mackey v. Nationwide
Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 420-22 (4th Cir. 1984); Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, supra note
25, at 779 n.150 (suggesting that §§ 1981 and 1982 might not reach rating decisions).
55. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Casuality Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106
(S.D. Ohio 1979). In Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984), the
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of territorial classification in property insurance may be scruti-
nized under the Fair Housing Act.5" Civil rights challenges to
classifications other than race or color, however, have failed for
lack of state action.5 7 There also has been debate about whether
classification challenges based upon civil rights statutes are
barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
5s
Fourth Circuit rejected Dunn's reasoning and held that the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1982), does not reach insurance practices. 724 F.2d at 424. See also
Badain, supra note 32, at 34-46; Note, supra note 32; Comment, supra note 32.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 reach only race and color-based discrimination. Although
claims of sex discrimination may be reached under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1982), such claims have failed in the insurance context for want of
state action. Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Life
Ins. Corp. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.), modified, 485 F. Supp. 56
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Philadelphia, 536 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1976); Jackson v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Philadelphia, 414 F. Supp 315 (E.D. Pa.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977); Madison v. Keystone Ins. Corp., No. 77-2559
(E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 21, 1978) (cited in Key, supra note 31, at 42); see also Freier v. New
York Life Ins. Corp., 679 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding state insurance regulation
insufficient to constitute state action). Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Corp.,
365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973), found the state activity in insurance regulation suffi-
cient under §§ 1983 and 1985, but the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Corp., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), caused the courts in the previously
cited cases to find state action wanting. Reichardt also held that Great Am. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), required that the substantive right pro-
tected under § 1985(3) be a federal one. Reichardt reasoned that if a § 1983 claim was
barred for want of state action, there was no substantive federal right on which to base a
sex discrimination claim.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance ....", 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982)). Justice Powell, dissenting in
Norris, argued that the majority's decision would make Title VII supersede state unfair
discrimination laws. 463 U.S. at 1099-1100 (1983). This, said Powell, was precisely the
kind of result McCarran-Ferguson was intended to prevent. Id. The majority responded
that because Arizona had abandoned the claim, it should not be addressed, but went on
to say that state law was not superseded because the decision addressed employment
practices rather than insurance practices. 463 U.S. at 1087-88 n.17.
At least two district courts have rejected the contention that McCarran-Ferguson
would bar a claim brought under a civil rights act. Ben v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp. questioned the intent and constitutional authority to do so if it were to "deprive a
citizen of access to the Federal Courts to obtain redress for violations of his civil rights
and require him to resort to the state courts as the sole forum of redress." 374 F. Supp.
1199, 1203 (D. Colo. 1974). Women in City Gov't United v. City of N.Y. questioned the
"indiscriminate" application of McCarran-Ferguson to legislation with a purpose that is
"not the regulation of commerce but the protection of other important federal interests.
..." 515 F. Supp. 295, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A number of other cases that have consid-
ered the application of civil rights statutes to insurance discrimination have not dis-
cussed McCarran-Ferguson. Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Philadelphia, 536
F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Assoc. Hosp. Serv. of Philadelphia, 414 F. Supp. 315
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Life Ins. Corp. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979), modified 485 F.
Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Stern v. Mass. Indem. & Life Ins. Corp., 365 F. Supp. 433
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.
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Federal legislation that would extend the antidiscrimination
principles of federal civil rights laws to all personal lines of in-
surance has been proposed in the past three Congresses by Sen-
ator Hatfield, Senator Packwood, and Representative Dingell.5 9
The Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell bill would prohibit insurers
from differentiating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in underwriting, coverage, and rating.60 It would
provide a private right of action to aggrieved persons" and
would empower the Attorney General to sue if the denial of
rights "raises an issue of general importance. ' 6 2 The proposal is
a relatively simple one that bans classifications, enumerates cov-
ered practices, and describes enforcement procedures and
remedies.
In summary, current federal law forbids classification by race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in employer-sponsored in-
Mass. 1972). See Jordan, Property Insurance and Fair Housing, 18 FORUM 223 (1982);
Note, Title VII and the McCarran Act: Sex Discrimination in Retirement Benefits by
Third Party Insurers, 68 GEO. L.J. 1285 (1980); Note, Title VII Clashes With McCarran-
Ferguson in the Pension Arena, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 859 (1980).
59. Senator Hatfield and Representative Dingell introduced identical bills in the 96th
Congress. Senator Packwood joined Senator Hatfield in introducing a revised version of
the bill in the 97th and 98th Congresses. Although Senator Hatfield was the principal
sponsor in all three Congresses, the bill is also associated with Senator Packwood be-
cause he chairs the committee that has considered it. The introductions of the bill have
been: H.R. 1793, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 372, supra note 7; S. 2204, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982); S. 2477, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 6536-39 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as S. 2477]; H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 100, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). For citations to the five sets of hearings
that have been held on this legislation, including texts of the bills for those sessions of
Congress, see supra note 26. For a discussion of the legislation, see Comment, Banning
"Actuarially Sound" Discrimination: The Proposed Non-Discrimination in Insurance
Act, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 631 (1983); Note, Ending Sex Discrimination in Insurance:
The Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, 11 J. LEGis. 457 (1984).
The Senate bill was reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation in the 97th Congress, S. REP. No. 671, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The House
bill was reported from the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the 98th Congress,
but it was so altered by amendments that its proponents abandoned support for it in
that form. Opponents Rewrite Unisex Insurance Bill, CONG. Q., Mar. 31, 1984, at 706,
707.
The text of the bill also has been introduced in the past three Congresses as Title III
of a proposed "Economic Equity Act," an omnibus bill of proposals addressed to sex
equity. S. 1169, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2472, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S.
288, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2090, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 888, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2090, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
This legislation appears to be well within the power of Congress under the commerce
clause. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944).
60. S. 372, supra note 7, § 4, reprinted in Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26,
at 6-8.
61. Id. § 6, reprinted in Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 11-12.
62. Id. § 7, reprinted in Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 12-13.
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surance plans .6 The Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell measure would
extend this ban to insurance plans in all the personal lines of
insurance, whether or not they are employer-sponsored.6" Other
federal civil rights statutes also may support a ban on race or
color classification in insurance policies, whether employer-spon-
sored or not, but there apparently is no federal remedy for al-
leged discrimination regarding other classifications such as sex.6 5
Some state statutes ban race classification in insurance.66
They do so more frequently in life insurance than in property
insurance.6 7 A few states instituted the race classification ban af-
ter the Civil War.6 Most, however, did not, and race was a.com-
monly used classification, at least in life insurance, through the
1950's. 9 Some state statutes also ban religious and national ori-
gin classification.
70
Today, insurers claim not to use race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin classification. 1 Even if these classifications play no
role in underwriting, rating, or coverage, a statute banning their
use could have an effect on current practices if it were inter-
preted to reach other classifications that have an adverse impact
63. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
66. Authorities cited in Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 224 n.8 are:
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-283, sub. 2 (West 1980); ARK STAT. ANN. §§ 66-
3005(7g) (1979); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140, 10141 (West 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-61(10) (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 73-1031, sub. 3 (Smith-Hurd
1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.12-085 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE §§ 482-234A, sub. (a),
(b), 48A-234AA, sub. (a), (c); MASS. ANN. LAWS § 175:122 (1979); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.2082 (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-210; N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 26-30-04(11) (1972 & 1981 Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.29B-4, sub.
(c), (d) (West 1973); N.Y. INS. LAW § 40(10) (McKinney 1966); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. tit. 39, § 3911.16; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-62-11, 42-62-14 (1977); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 40.60.175, 40.60.178 (West 1962).
67. The complaint in property insurance often concerns geographical classifications
that have considerable impact on racial or ethnic minorities. The refusal to insure based
on geographical classification alone is referred to as "redlining." For a description of
state legislative approaches to redlining, see Badain, supra note 32, at 23-31.
68. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 122 (West 1977) (first passed in 1884);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2082 (West 1983) (first passed in 1869).
69. See authorities cited in Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 32, at 351 n.135, 352 n.139.
70. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-384 (Supp. 1984-1985); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (West
1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (West 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1031 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.12-085 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48-A, §
234AA (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-3512 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(a) (West 1970); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2609 (McKinney
1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.44.220 (1984).
71. Senate Hearings on S. 2477, supra note 26, at 25; see also authorities cited in
Comment, supra note 59, at 631 n.8.
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on individuals within the banned classifications.7" For example,
residence zip code, commonly used in automobile and property




Major public opposition to Norris, Manhart, the Hatfield-
Packwood-Dingell proposal, and state legislation has focused on
sex classification.74 Unlike race, color, religion, and national ori-
gin, insurers use sex classification in rating in health, disability,
life, annuity, and automobile insurance. 5 Many states restrict
the use of sex classification in underwriting and coverage, 7 but
there are few such restrictions regarding rating even though sig-
nificant rate differentials can have the same effect as a refusal to
underwrite if the rate is, or is perceived by consumers to be,
unaffordable. Four states-Hawaii, Michigan, Massachusetts,
and North Carolina-have recently banned sex classification in
rating, as well as in automobile insurance underwriting and cov-
erage.77 Only Montana extends this ban to all the personal lines
of insurance.78
Some state statutes that restrict the use of classifications with
antidiscrimination language do not do so entirely. Some prohibit
only classification without actuarial justification,7" or only differ-
ent treatment based "solely" on the specified classification.80
72. See infra notes 350-59 and accompanying text; House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th
Cong., supra note 26, at 1017-23 (memorandum to Rep. Dingell from N.Y. State Sen.
Donald Halperin).
73. See studies cited supra note 21.
74. See supra note 26.
75. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
76. Much of the impetus for these provisions came from a Model Regulation to Elim-
inate Unfair Sex Discrimination developed by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). See Note, Challenges to Sex-Based Mortality Tables in Insur-
ance and Pensions, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59, 67 nn.68-69 (1980) (listing states that
have adopted the regulation); see also Senate Hearings on S. 2477, supra note 26, at 49
(text of NAIC Model Regulation), 313-15 (listing states that have adopted same). For
other compilations of states adopting the regulation, see House Hearings on H.R. 100,
98th Cong., supra note 26, at 690-91; Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 336.
77. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-33 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ 22E, 24A
(West 1983 & Supp. 1985); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 500.2027(c) (West 1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-303 (1982 & Supp. 1985); see Austin, supra note 11, at 528 n.57 (citing N.Y.
Times, Mar, 23, 1983, at D2, col. 1) (regarding failed attempts in Florida, Louisiana, New
Jersey, and Wyoming).
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1985). Insurance industry lobbyists have been seek-
ing repeal or evisceration of the law. Montana Debates Sex-Blind Insurance Law, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at A33, col. 1.
79. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10144 (West Supp. 1985) (prohibiting classification
based on blindness, partial blindness, or a physical or mental impairment); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 10-3-1104(1)(f)(III) (Supp. 1984) (prohibiting classification based on marital sta-
tus or sex).
80. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(7)(g) (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting classification
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The first category seems to do no more than the unfair discrimi-
nation statutes that exist in all states and require that classifica-
tions be supported by valid data showing a statistical difference
in loss."1 The meaning of the second is unclear, but it may re-
quire little more than the first.8 2 Other statutes attempt to for-
mulate a standard for heightened scrutiny that is less than a ban
but more than mere statistical association with loss.
83
A number of state statutes take an antidiscrimination ap-
proach in banning classifications beyond race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Some statutes proscribe classifications
based generally on physical 84 or mental impairment,8 5 a specific
disability, 8 or a genetic trait.8 7 A federal proposal would pro-
scribe blindness as a classification. 8 State statutes have pro-
scribed the use of such other classifications as marital status,8 9
based on race, color, creed, or sex); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9705 (West 1984) (prohibiting
classification based on severe disability).
81. See infra notes 115-16, 213 and accompanying text.
82. See State Dep't of Ins. v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984) (including extensive discussion in
the dissent of possible interpretations of such language).
83. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 848 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (requiring that no
life insurer "shall make or permit any distinction or discrimination against individuals
with handicaps or disabilities.., unless the rate differential is based on sound actuarial
principles and a reasonable system of classification and is related to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience directly associated with the handicap or disability"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 72A.20(8) (West Supp. 1985) (requiring that no life insurer shall refuse to issue or
discriminate in the issuance of a policy "on the basis of a disability ... unless the claims
experience and actuarial projections and other data establish significant and substantial
differences in class rates because of the disability").
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(7)(f) (Supp. 1985); CAL. INS. CODE § 10144 (West Supp.
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.644 (West 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48-A, § 223 (Supp.
1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 193T (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 746.015 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.300 (1984).
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(7)(f) (Supp. 1985); CAL. INS. CODE § 10144 (West Supp.
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9705 (West 1984); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 120A (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.300 (1984).
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9705 (West
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 848 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:652.1 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-A (Supp. 1985-1986);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48-A, § 226 (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20(8) (West Supp.
1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-1 (1979).
87. CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West
Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48-A, § 223 (Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-195.5
(1982).
88. S. 1290, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985); S. 2775, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC.
S7646-48 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
89. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(7)(e) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104
(Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (West 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
417:4(VIII)(e) (1983); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2067 (McKinney 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1171.5 (Purdon Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 38.1-381.6 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.30.300 (1984).
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occupation,9" and military service.9 1 Many of these statutes in-
volve less than a complete ban of the classifications.9 2
Use of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, the "spe-
cial five" classifications, should be banned in insurance even if
they are statistically associated with loss. A federal prohibition
on the use of these classifications, as proposed by the Hatfield-
Packwood-Dingell bill, should be imposed. A ban of these classi-
fications is warranted on grounds that have been advanced by
some of those arguing from an antidiscrimination perspective.
These special five classifications have been banned in other ar-
eas of law.9 3 This in itself reflects a social judgment about their
legitimacy that should warrant a ban on their use in insurance
as well.94 This social judgment reflects the immutable and as-
criptive character of these classifications as well as their long
history of abuse.9 5 One could debate whether these factors ex-
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.24 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1171.5 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE § 38.1-381.6 (Supp. 1985).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (West 1984); VA. CODE § 38.1-381.6 (Supp. 1985).
92. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (banning special five's use in em-
ployment); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982) (credit); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982) (ban-
ning special five's use in some aspects of education). The Supreme Court has interpreted
Title VII to ban the special five classifications with regard to employer-sponsored insur-
ance. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. See also Jerry & Mansfield, supra
note 32, at 334 n.28 for citations to Supreme Court cases extending equal status to
women with regard to other federal statutes.
94. Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 32, at 345-54, 359-62. The disparity in treatment
created by the ban on the special five classifications in employer-sponsored plans has
been advanced as a justification for extending the ban to insurance that is not employer-
sponsored. Comment, supra note 59, at 643 & n.69.
95. Professor Brilmayer, Professor Laycock, and their colleagues have observed that
these two characteristics are common to the classifications banned by employment dis-
crimination law. They also identify a third characteristic that they call "irrelevance."
Irrelevance means that the characteristic itself is of no legitimate interest to an employer
but that its supposed statistical association with some legitimate characteristics is what
is really on his mind.
The Brilmayer-Laycock group then finds two implications in such irrelevance. First,
the special five classifications are likely to be overly inclusive. Some people who should
qualify for the job, or by analogy for insurance, would be disqualified. For example, re-
fusing to hire women because a job requires lifting heavy objects likely will disqualify
some women who could lift the weight required. Similarly, charging men more for life
insurance because as a group they do not live as long as women as a group disadvantages
the men with long life expectancies. Second, the statistical association may be a spurious
one that obscures intervening variables, which are the confusion of correlation and cau-
sation. For example, sex mortality differences between men and women may be ex-
plained by behavior patterns such as smoking, drinking, military service, automobile
driving frequency, and career pursuit rather than a genetic factor. Comment, supra note
59, at 637 n.39 (citing Lewis & Lewis, The Potential Impact of Sexual Equality on
Health, 297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 863, 865 (1977)). Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues
devote a substantial portion of their Article to examining evidence that suggests sex may
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plain the proscription of these classifications,"6 but they provide
a justification in any event.
This justification can be criticized.9 7 The legal protections re-
garding sex, though stronger than protections regarding some
other classifications,"8 are not so absolute as for race, color, reli-
gion, and national origin 9e The lower level of legal protection for
sex arguably could justify a different treatment for sex than the
other special classifications in insurance. Additional classifica-
tions such as age and handicap also have received legal protec-
tions. What level of legal protection in other areas should justify
a ban on their use in insurance classification? A disabling birth
defect may be immutable, and disability has been subject to his-
torical abuse. This Article proposes criteria for judging all classi-
fications 00 that would likely result in banning the use of the
birth defect as a classifier but would not ban it per se as with
the special five.
Sex should be treated like race, color, religion, and national
origin in insurance.10 1 Regardless of the persuasiveness of the
antidiscrimination argument for elimination of sex classification
in insurance, a ban should flow as well from consideration of the
perspectives of the importance of insurance and competition in
the insurance market.10 2 Classifications beyond the special five
also should be scrutinized, and at least some should be restricted
after testing against criteria tailored to the function insurance
mask differences attributable to life-style. Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination, supra note 31,
at 526-33. Professor Laycock has discussed further the immutability, historical abuse,
and irrelevance criteria. Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judical
Review (Book Review), 59 TEx. L. REv. 343, 382-88 (1980).
This Article addresses the issues concerned in the Brilmayer-Laycock group's second
implication of irrelevance in the context of criteria that an insurance classification sys-
tem should meet. See infra notes 149-51, 156-63 & 399-404 and accompanying text.
96. One might argue that these bans result from political strategies or clout of minor-
ity groups and women that have little to do with rational analysis of underlying theory.
It has been suggested that the ban on sex discrimination in employment resulted in part
from a southern representative's attempt to kill the employment discrimination title of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1977). See also Note, TIAA-
CREF Annuity System, supra note 31, at 1233 n.19, and authorities cited therein, for
documentation of this bit of Title VII history.
97. See Laycock, supra note 95, at 382-88.
98. See, e.g., the discussion of the protections with regard to age in Jerry & Mans-
field, supra note 32, at 347-57.
99. For a discussion of the difference in treatment for race and sex in employment
law, see Rutherglen, supra note 31, at 224-31.
100. See infra notes 399-404 and accompanying text.
101. For an argument that race and sex should be considered differently in constitu-
tional law, see Rutherglen, supra note 31, at 205-12.
102. See infra notes 250-346 and accompanying text.
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plays in society and the specific goals for classification proposed
in this Article. Such criteria are outlined in Part 111.103
In 1980, Senator Metzenbaum introduced the Insurance Com-
petition Improvement Act. 04 This Article advocates some of the
features of the Metzenbaum bill as proposed and other features
with some changes. Like the Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell bill, the
Metzenbaum bill would have banned the use of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, and national origin in underwriting, coverage, and rat-
ing. 105 In addition, it would have banned the use of marital sta-
tus, personal living habits, appearances, marital history, political
activities, and, in some instances, occupation. 106  It also
presented a list of criteria against which all other classifiers pro-
posed in rating would be judged as well as limiting criteria for
which underwriting could be refused. It included provisions di-
rected toward enhancing desirable competition in insurance in-
cluding provision of information that consumers could use to
comparison shop.10 7 The Metzenbaum bill was limited to prop-
erty/casualty insurance,10 8 while the Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell
bill would apply to all personal lines of insurance.10 9 The reform
package advocated by this Article"10 would govern all personal
lines of insurance.
B. Traditional Fair Discrimination Examined
This Section outlines why traditional fair discrimination, as
practiced and sanctioned by most state regulators, is not the
model of fairness to the public that is claimed. State unfair dis-
crimination statutes are interpreted to permit any rating classi-
fier for which a statistical difference between groups can be
shown, while ignoring other issues.
Underwriting classifications usually are not reviewed at all.
Most states do no independent review of rating classifications.
103. See infra notes 395-404 and accompanying text.
104. S. 2474, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 6529-36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
S. 2474].
105. S. 2474, supra note 104, at § 6(a)(1), 126 CONG. REc. at 6530-31.
106. The ban on occupational classification would have excepted situations when the
discharge of occupational duties "directly and demonstrably causes increased exposure
to loss." Id.
107. See infra notes 407-09 and accompanying text.
108. S. 2474, supra note 104, at § 6 and definitions in § 4.
109. S. 372, supra note 7, § 3, reprinted in Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26,
at 4.
110. See infra notes 395-414 and accompanying text.
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The motivation for and consequence of selection by insurers
among possible classifiers is not considered. Possible cross-subsi-
dization between lines is not investigated. The variation in loss
prediction among group members is masked by the group aver-
age test. The multiplicative effect of classifiers exacerbates the
rates of those falling in several high-risk classifications. Ex-
penses often are apportioned arbitrarily as a percentage of pre-
mium rather than actual cost. The causal plausibility of classifi-
cation is ignored.
This Section also reviews the history and judicial interpreta-
tion of state unfair discrimination statutes. Neither supports a
conclusion that such statutes require, or even urge, refined clas-
sification. Their dominant concern is treatment of equals
equally, not differentiation when possible.
1. Does fairness to the public demand it?- The deference
regulators, legislators, and courts have given traditional fair dis-
crimination has left reform proposals with a heavy and unwar-
ranted burden of justification. Insurers argue that fair discrimi-
nation is fair because each insured pays according to what he
receives rather than being subsidized by others. It even has been
argued that for an insurer to redistribute policyholders' re-
sources without their consent would be "immoral."11 '
The traditional fair discrimination perspective purports to
emphasize the value of each paying his own way. One could ar-
gue that altruism rather than rugged individualism should be
encouraged as a social value11 and that emphasis on division in
society is undesirable.113 This Article's recommendations for im-
mediate action do not depend for their acceptance on the adop-
tion of one or the other set of values. The short-term recommen-
111. Williams, Unfair Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in INSUR-
ANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE REGULATION 209, 221 (S.
Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969) (quoting D.L. MACDONALD, CORPORATE RISK CON-
TROL 82 (1966)).
112. Austin, supra note 11, at 581, so argues although her proposal for community
fire insurance would still permit some classification. Under her proposal, properties that
failed to meet certain safety standards would not be insured. Id. at 582. Those who be-
lieve in altruism as a value generally are still willing to put some limits on insurability.
Where those lines should be drawn should vary with the type of insurance. The fewest
limits would be appropriate in health insurance where access to insurance may be tanta-
mount to access to health care, which in turn may be the difference between life and
death. See infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
113. In Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins.,
supra note 21, at 143, Carl Levin, a U.S. Senator, then Detroit City Council President,
said: "I think the broader the rating, the better. In this society if we want to be one
society-and I know this doesn't agree with much other testimony-but if we want to be
one society it seems to me we've got to share a lot of risks."
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dations would continue considerable classification but give
greater emphasis to perceived legitimacy. Statistical association
with risk would remain a permissible consideration but would
not be the only one. An insurance availability study is advocated
for the express purpose of stimulating public debate in the
longer term on how broadly particular risks should be spread.' 14
Even if one accepts each paying his own way as the preferable
social value, current insurance classification and its regulation
do not achieve the neutral, scientific ends that their proponents
and many others assume. The following outlines the biases and
irrationalities in the classification process as it actually
functions.
a. The minimal standards required by state unfair discrimi-
nation statutes- According to the General Accounting Office,
most states require only that classifiers "reasonably reflect dif-
ferences in loss experience and that the data be credible."' 115
This test requires only that the average loss of groups so classi-
fied shows a reasonable difference."' Meeting this group average
test is not an adequate measure of fairness to the public, princi-
pally because the test does not ensure, or come close to ensuring,
that each pays his own way- 1
Generally, rating classification schemes must be submitted to
state insurance authorities for review. Although "unfair discrim-
ination" usually is prohibited with regard to underwriting and
coverage decisions as well as rating, insurers are not required, as
they are with regard to rating, to submit the criteria used in un-
derwriting to regulatory authorities." 8 Little empirical work on
what state regulators actually do in reviewing rating classifica-
114. See infra notes 305-11, 405-06 and accompanying text.
115. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 127. This definition is that said by the General
Accounting Office to reflect the legal criteria for automobile insurance rating classifica-
tions. Id. The GAO defined credibility to mean "that there be enough cases for the data
to be statistically valid in predicting the class average of a primary driver class or terri-
tory separately-but not any particular one of the myriad subcells taken individually."
Id. at 127 n.1. In other words, there must be a statistically significant difference in loss
for the class of all drivers under 25, but the expected loss need not reflect actual experi-
ence for subclasses such as single men under 25 with no prior accidents or tickets who
live in a particular urban area.
116. Senate Hearings on S. 2474, supra note 19, at 24.
117. For an example of a classification accepted by a court without statistical justifi-
cation, see infra note 248 and accompanying text.
118. The General Accounting Office surveyed state insurance departments on their
authority with regard to underwriting guidelines. Only 12 of the 43 state regulators re-
sponding said they could forbid particular guidelines. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at
149-50. The GAO concluded that "it appears that few State insurance departments re-
view or even collect the underwriting guidelines used by insurance companies in their
states." Id. at 50.
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tions is available.1 ' A 1979 General Accounting Office (GAO)
study conducted fieldwork on state insurance regulation in sev-
enteen states. 120 The GAO found that no state systematically
performed independent actuarial analysis of the statistical rela-
tionships on which insurance companies based classifications.'21
Few reported cases discuss standards for classification review.'22
b. Choice among classifiers- Even if all classifiers used met
the group average test, the resulting scheme would not avoid all
subsidy so that each would pay his own way. For any insured in
any line of insurance, there are a number of possible classifica-
tions with a statistical association to risk. One example is the
newborn, black male in South Carolina for whom sex, race, state
of birth, and national residence all might be used as predictors
of life expectancy. Depending on which of these classifications is
used, the baby's life expectancy varies from 58.33 to 70.75
years. 123 For an insured seeking homeowner's insurance, there
will be a number of possible classifiers, each of which might pro-
duce a different group average loss record. For fire coverage
alone, these might include residence zip code, presence of smoke
alarms, distance from the nearest fire house, combustibility of
the material of which the house is constructed, whether the peo-
ple in the house smoke, and myriad others.
Insurers choose among possible classifications. State review, if
119. The pioneering effort on the functioning of insurance regulation was E. PATTER-
SON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES (1927). Almost all the subse-
quent work has been done by Spencer Kimball and those collaborating with him. Kim-
ball's comparison of regulation in Wisconsin and Utah in 1968 shows that most of the
regulatory emphasis is on the base rate rather than the classification. Kimball & Boyce,
The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in
Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 557-66 (1958). For further discussion of
regulation in Wisconsin and Utah, see Kimball & Hansen, The Utah Insurance Commis-
sioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation in Action (pts 1 & 2), 5 UTAH L. REV. 429
(1957), 6 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1958); S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1960).
120. GAO REPORT, supra note 11.
121. Id. at 130.
122. For the method I used to find state cases, see infra note 207. Some state deci-
sions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 207-49. In one case, a court permitted
the use of a classification despite the absence of statistical evidence. A Florida intermedi-
ate court overturned the state insurance commissioner's rejection of the use of the "good
student discount," for which "'no insurance company submitted any actuarial data link-
ing scholastic achievement to accident avoidance'" and which Allstate, the nation's sec-
ond largest automobile insurer, had said was "indefensible actuarially." State Dep't of
Ins. v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908, 913 n.8, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984). In justification, the court said only that
"there was testimony that there are differences in expected loss experience between
those who qualify for scholastic achievement discount and those who do not." Id.
123. This example is taken from Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at
512 n.32:
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there is any, focuses only on whether the chosen classifiers meet
the group average test. If other classifiers that are not used
would provide different answers about individual risk, one can-
not accurately say that subsidy in fact has been avoided. For
example, insurers argue that sex classification in life insurance
avoids subsidy because women as a group live longer than men
as a group. Until recently, when smoking began to be used
widely as a classifier in life insurance, one could say that non-
smoking men subsidized women who smoked.12
If pressed, insurers will admit that there are myriad classifiers
and that they make choices among them. Insurers still defend
fair discrimination as they practice it by saying that the criteria
used for selecting among the potential classifiers are inherently
fair. Three such criteria commonly cited are significance, stabil-
ity, and practicality of use. 12 5 For example, gender is argued to
meet these criteria. It is said to have significance because it is
statistically associated with risk in life, health, disability, and
automobile insurance, stability because it ordinarily does not
change over time,126 and practicality of use because it is cheap to
determine and difficult to misrepresent. Even if all agreed that
such criteria were fair, and insurers actually used them alone, it
still would not be accurate to say that a classification system us-
ing only some of the possible classifiers avoids subsidies and as-
EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH
(Selected Categories, 1969-1971)
United States South Carolina
All persons 70.75 67.96
,All males 67.04 63.85
All non-whites 64.95 62.64
Non-white males 60.98 58.33
SOURCE: Greville, Some Trends and Comparisons of United States Life-Ta-
ble Data: 1900-1971, in 1 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICs, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, U.S. DECENNIAL LIFE TABLES FOR 1969-71, no.
4, Table 4, at 4-10 (1975).
Works, supra note 20, at 460, calls the "selection of class-defining risk indicia ...
inevitably imperfect and value laden." He quotes Alfred Kahn's remarks about classifica-
tions in another context: "'[A]ll involve complex distributional effects; all will be eco-
nomically imperfect, and all will inevitably raise noneconomic questions about what is
fair, politically acceptable, and so on.'" Id.
124. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 124, makes a similar point about cross-subsidies
by linking them to homogeneity of groups.
125. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 108.
126. The proposition that sex is a stable predictor has been challenged. See
Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 542-56, marshalling evidence that the
relationship of sex to longevity has changed over time and varied among cultures. Dis-
putes with their position and their response are found in other Articles in the septology
cited in that footnote.
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sures that each pays his own way. Anything short of use of all
possible classifiers with statistical significance will lead to some
subsidy. The most insurers can claim for the classifiers they use
is that meeting criteria such as significance, stability, and practi-
cality does what is feasible and provides perceived legitimacy.
They usually claim far more.
In fact, these three criteria are not the only ones used in
choosing classifiers. Insurers also make choices among classifica-
tion based on their utility in marketing. 127 Insurers acknowledge
that one motivation for starting to use sex in life insurance clas-
sification was the perception of women as a growing market.
12 8
Some disability insurance companies have started eliminating
sex difference for occupations at the top of the income scale.
1 29
Some classifiers used in automobile and homeowner's insurance
parallel socioeconomic status and are designed to attract cus-
tomers likely to buy multiple coverage and policies.' 30
When one looks at the history of male versus female classifica-
tion, one wonders if it might be better explained by a perception
of men as more valued customers than women than as a neutral,
statistical exercise.' 3' Women generally pay more than men for
127. New Jersey Dep't of Ins. Automobile Insurance Rate Classification: An Over-
view of Findings, Conclusions and Remedies 1063 (1981), reprinted in House Hearings
on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra note 26, at 1057-1171 [hereinafter cited as N.J. Overview,
with page cites to the House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong.].
128. See Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 218 (testimony of Robert N.
Houser, Chairman of the Board, Banker's Life Insurance, and John H. Filer, Chairman,
Aetna Life and Casualty); Kiesel, A Matter of Policy: Sex Bias in Insurance, Attacked,
Defended, 67 A.B.A. J. 875, 876 (1983).
129. See Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 276 (testimony of Elizabeth S.
Morrison, Vice-President and manager of an actuarial benefits and compensation con-
sulting firm).
130. Austin, supra note 11, at 535 n.101 (citing N.J. Overview, supra note 127 and G.
GLENDENNING & R. HOLTOM, PERSONAL LINES UNDERWRITING 73 (1977)).
131. A past President of the Society of Actuaries, E. Paul Barnhart, has testified that
"[h]istorically, the insurance industry has been quick to recognize areas where women's
costs are higher than men's and to charge more; slow to recognize areas where women's
costs are lower and to charge less." Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 355.
The remedy Barnhart supports is closer relation in pricing to statistical differences
rather than abolition of sex classification.
Each of the five sets of hearings on Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell, supra note 26, has
included representatives of women's and civil rights groups testifying about a litany of
differences in treatment between men and women. For example, the most recent Senate
hearings included testimony from the Women's Equity Action League, National Organi-
zation for Women, National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs,
American Association of University Women, American Association of Retired Persons,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Council of Jewish
Women, American Nurses Association, and others. Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra
note 26. The sources for many of the examples in all five hearings is a survey by the
Women's Equity Action League, WOMEN'S EQUITY ACTION LEAGUE, SEX DISCRIMINATION
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individual health and disability insurance. 132 Until recently,
women's policies usually were subject to more restrictions and
provided less coverage. 133 Insurers justify cost differences in
health and disability insurance with group average statistical
differences in loss between men and women.134 At the same time,
the rates for women over forty-five do not reflect statistics show-
ing fewer medical expenses and periods of disability for women
than men in this age group.13 5 Medicare supplemental insurance
for those over sixty-five generally is provided on a unisex basis,
even though statistical differences in loss would justify cheaper
policies for women."3 6
Women pay less in life insurance, but until recently their rates
commonly were based on a three-year setback from men's tables
when the actual gap in life expectancy was six to nine years.
1 3 7
At the same time, annuities, for which women paid more, re-
flected the full gap in life expectancy. 38 Some large employers
used integrated tables for life insurance when women would
IN INSURANCE, A GUIDE FOR WOMEN [hereinafter cited as WEAL STUDY] reprinted in
Senate Hearings on S. 2477, supra note 26, at 224-87. Perhaps in response to the contro-
versy generated by Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell, to similar efforts in the states, and to
litigation, some of the practices enumerated in the WEAL STUDY seem to have changed.
Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 335-46 (comments of the Alliance of Ameri-
can Insurers, American Council of Life Insurance, American Insurance Association,
Health Insurance Association of America, Insurance Services Office, and National Associ-
ation of Independent Insurers).
132. Senate Hearings on S. 2477, supra note 26, at 233-40 (WEAL STUDY). Testi-
mony of various witnesses at the five hearings on Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell, supra note
26, provided other examples. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 42,
52 (testimony of Kathy Wilson, Chair, National Women's Political Caucus).
133. Senate Hearnings on S. 2477, supra note 26, at 233-40 (WEAL STUDY). Testi-
mony of various witnesses at the five hearings on Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell, supra note
26, provided other examples. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 42,
52 (testimony of Kathy Wilson, Chair, National Women's Political Caucus).
134. Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 343 (testimony on behalf of the
insurance industry in response to Senate Commerce Comm. Rep. on S. 2204).
135. E. Paul Barnhart, a past President of the Society of Actuaries, has testified that
women over 45 pay more than statistics indicate. Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note
26, at 362. He says that at "age 60, [women] should be paying no more than 70 to 80
percent as much as men, but in the rate manuals of too many companies the female age
60 rate is still as high as 90 to 98 percent of the corresponding male rate." Id.
136. E. Paul Barnhart says that women of the age eligible for the Medicare supple-
ment have 30 to 35% lower costs than men of the same age. He projects that if Medicare
supplemental were sex differentiated, women would pay 15% less and men 20% more.
Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 362.
137. House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra note 26, at 232; see Senate
Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 335, 341 (insurance industry response on changed
practices).
138. House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra note 26, at 232; see Senate
Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 335, 341 (insurance industry response on changed
practices).
Insurance Classification
have benefited from sex segregation while using separate tables
for annuities when women would suffer a disadvantage with
their use.13 9 Women pay less than men for automobile insurance
only up to age twenty-five, even though a statistical difference in
loss between men and women exists throughout life. 40
So long as classifications are permitted, some classifications
that create groups with different average expected losses neces-
sarily will be used while others will be discarded. The proposal
here is not to prohibit a classification because it is useful as a
sales device for insurers, but rather to demonstrate the fallacy of
the notion that introduction by government of values other than
statistical association with loss would do violence to what is now
a neutral, scientific process."
c. Cross-subsidization among lines of insurance- The mea-
sure of each paying his own way in property and casualty insur-
ance also can be criticized if underwriting losses and investment
income in one line are used to offset lower profits in another line
and because the measure of each paying his own way generally
ignores profits from investment income. It has been suggested
that personal insurance lines subsidize commercial lines in prop-
erty/casualty insurance. High profits in commercial property/
casualty insurance in the late 1970's attracted new entrants to
the market and generated vigorous price competition. 14 2 To gain
or hold market share, many insurers apparently priced their
commercial products below cost 4 3 as evidenced by the commer-
cial property and casualty industry's underwriting losses of
thirty-four billion dollars from 1979 to 1983.1"" It has been
charged that investment income and underwriting profits earned
in personal automobile and homeowner's insurance may have
been used by companies to subsidize commercial losses.'45 In any
139. Examples include the City of Los Angeles and the University of Chicago.
Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 530 nn.116-17.
140. See House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra note 26, at 1070-71.
141. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 175 (statement of T.
Lawrence Jones, President of the American Insurance Association) ("Probability mathe-
matics and its application to natural events is the very foundation of our industry.").
142. Insurers are Scrambling to Break Their Losing Streak, Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 1984,
at 144 [hereinafter cited as Insurers are Scrambling].
143. Id.; Higher Insurance Rates for Autos, Homes Seen as Insurers' Costs Rise on
Other Lines, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1983, at 18, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Higher Insur-
ance Rates].
144. Insurers are Scrambling, supra note 142, at 144.
145. See infra note 148. Higher Insurance Rates, supra note 143, contrasts insurers'
acceptance of substantial rate increases recommended by rating bureaus for personal
lines of insurance with insurers' adoption of very small increases for commercial lines.
The Wall Street Journal reported that "[i]nsurers staunchly deny they are using profits
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event, high interest earned on invested premiums generated by
these personal lines offsets much of the industry's commercial
losses.1"6 The majority of state regulators do not take investment
income into account in judging profitability for ratemaking in
automobile and homeowner's insurance. 4 7 If they do, they do
not look at issues of cross-subsidy between lines of insurance.148
d. Additional problems- There are several other problems
with saying that traditional fair discrimination, as practiced by
insurers and as-permitted by most regulators, is fair to the pub-
lic. Massachusetts and New Jersey are unique in the degree of
scrutiny they have given to automobile insurance classifica-
tions.'" Studies in both states focused on homogeneous versus
heterogeneous groups in examining the fairness of using group
average alone as a justification for a particular classification. 150 A
group half of whose members have losses of $90 and half of
whom have losses of $10 will have a group average loss of $50, as
will a group half of whose members have losses of $45 and half
losses of $55. The latter group, though, is far more homogene-
from personal insurance to subsidize commercial customers. But they do say that these
personal lines, particularly automobile insurance, have become big money makers for
them." Higher Insurance Rates, supra note 143. This Article suggests cross-subsidies
might be possible because the markets for the personal lines of insurance are uncompeti-
tive. On competitiveness in the industry, see infra notes 312-46 and accompanying text.
146. Higher Insurance Rates, supra note 143, at 18, col. 2-3.
147. See generally 1 R. HUNTER, TAKING THE BITE OUT OF INSURANCE: INVESTMENT
INCOME IN RATEMAKING (1980). According to this study, only 17 states take investment
income into account in private passenger car ratemaking. This study shows that the
method used in 13 of those states "seriously understates the impact of investment in-
come as it relates to the ratemaking process." Id. at 1-2. Hunter also quotes the Insur-
ance Services Office, the major ratemaking bureau relied upon in states, as reporting that
only four states require investment income to be taken into account in homeowner's in-
surance ratemaking. Id. at 12.
148. At least partly in response to the Study of R. HUNTER (sponsored by the Na-
tional Insurance Consumers Organization (NICO)), supra note 147, the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) appointed a task force to consider investment
income issues. NICO asked NAIC to study whether "unfair discrimination was occuring
... as a result of insurer's practice [sic] of using some of the investment income from
personal lines to cross-subsidize commercial lines." NICO (National Insurance Con-
sumer Organization) Newsletter, July/Aug. 1984, at 5 (emphasis in original). The NAIC
Advisory Committee for the study refused to consider that issue. Id.
149. See DIvISION OF INSURANCE, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, OPINION, FIND-
INGS AND DECISION ON 1978 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATES (1977), reprinted in Senate
Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., supra note 21, at
488-553 [hereinafter cited as Mass. Opinion, with page cites to the Senate hearings];
background papers published in DIVISION OF INSURANCE, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHU-
SETrS, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION: EQUITY AND ACCURACY (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Mass. Background Papers]; N.J. Order, supra note 27; N.J. Overview,
supra note 127.
150. See Mass. Background Papers, supra note 149, at 74-109; N.J. Order, supra
note 27, at 1087-89; N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1099-1103, 1124-25, 1161-65.
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ous. Both state studies concluded that a concern for unfair dis-
crimination should include a concern that classifications create
groups that are relatively homogeneous rather than heterogene-
ous.151 Because I favor broader risk sharing for at least some
coverages, this Article's proposed criteria for judging classifica-
tions do not include homogeneity. Nonetheless, the existence of
heterogeneous groups is one of the refutations that the value of
each paying his own way is furthered in a system requiring that
classifications meet only a group average test.
The Massachusetts and New Jersey studies also identified a
multiplicative effect in the way automobile risk classifications
were used. 152 The New Jersey Insurance Commissioner found
that a policyholder from a territory with twice the average claim
cost and whose driver classifications, such as age and sex, were
three times the average was charged six times the statewide av-
erage rate. s53
In addition, both states found to be unfair the practice of ap-
portioning expenses to policyholders in proportion to their ex-
pected claims. 54 Under this practice, policyholders in higher
rated classifications pay more money for expenses than those in
lower rated classifications even though the costs of servicing
their accounts do not differ in the same magnitude. 5
Classifications such as sex also have been criticized as masking
the real causes of statistical difference in loss. A scientific or sta-
tistical theorist would assert that causation can never be
known. 156 In their terms, a causal theory might be seen only as a
151. See Mass. Background Papers, supra note 149, at 74-109; N.J. Order, supra
note 27, at 1087-89; N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1099-1103, 1124-25, 1161-65.
A background paper to the Massachusetts's Commissioner's Order developed a meth-
odology for determining the degree of undercharging and overcharging in a particular
group to assess the relative homogeneity of the group. Ferreira, Identifying Equitable
Insurance Premiums for Risk Classes: An Alternative to the Classical Approach, in
Mass. Background Papers, supra note 149, at 74-121.
152. See Chang & Fairley, An Estimation Model for Multivariate Insurance Rate
Classification, in Mass. Background Papers, supra note 149, at 25-55; N.J. Order, supra
note 27, at 1083-84; N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1154-56.
153. N.J. Order, supra note 27, at 1083-84. An alternate method was developed in
the Massachusetts proceeding. See Chang & Fairley, supra note 152, for an explanation.
154. Mass. Opinion, supra note 149, at 542-46; N.J. Order, supra note 27, at 1084-87;
N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1156-61.
155. Mass. Opinion, supra note 149, at 542-46; N.J. Order, supra note 27, at 1084-87;
N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1156-61.
156. See, e.g., C. HEmuEL, ASPECTS OF SCIEsTIFIC EXPLANATION 347-54 (1945) & K.
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DiscovERY 56-62 (1968) (cited in Underwood, supra
note 33, at 1445 n.94). For efforts to deal with causation in the law, see G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 294-95 (1970); H.L.A. HART &
A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 1-7 (1959) (cited in Underwood, supra note 33, at
1445 n.94).
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working hypothesis.15 7 Fair discriminators point to the theoreti-
cal impossibility of determining causation to justify correlation
as sufficient reason for ignoring whether or not a classification is
supported by a causal explanation.
1 58
Classifiers that do not seem grounded in a causal explanation,
however, draw considerable criticism.159 Given the vital nature
of the personal lines of insurance,160 there should be a percep-
tion of legitimacy regarding classifications that determine who
can purchase insurance, what it will cost, and what coverage can
be bought. Plausible theories of causation are important to such
a perception. Thus, this factor is an appropriate value in a
scheme for classification regulation despite the limitations on
definitively determining causation. 161
In addition, a causal theory suggests qualifications to the pre-
dictive value of a classification. 1 2 If the mortality differences be-
tween men and women are thought to be genetic, they would not
be expected to change over time. If a more plausible causal an-
swer is, say, differences in alcohol or tobacco use, this may sug-
gest that the pattern will change as behavior changes. Also, pub-
lication of this factor may lead to behavioral changes that could




Finally, at least some of the classification variables currently
used in the personal lines of insurance are not particularly pow-
erful predictors of future loss. A study of automobile classifica-
157. C. HEMPEL, supra note 156.
158. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and
Women: A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 583, 626. Benston, Economics of Gender Discrimination, supra note 31, at
514, says it is "preferable" that the postulated relationships be grounded in a causal
theory that would predict whether the relationship would continue in changed circum-
stances but "this is not necessary if past relationships have been stable and previous
predictions accurate."
159. Underwood, supra note 33, at 1444. The substance of this point is drawn from
Professor Underwood's article. Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues, supra note 31,
make a similar point, but they state the desire for causal variables as more a value in
itself than important to achieving perceived legitimacy and providing hypotheses about
the continued stability of classification variables as argued here.
160. See supra notes 11-16 and infra notes 250-311 and accompanying text.
161. Austin criticizes the argument for causal connection as a criterion for selection
of permissible classifiers. Austin, supra note 11, at 559-63. As she argues, a search for
causal connection does not provide an objective, neutral criterion or eliminate value
judgments. Underwood's rationale for a concern for causal connection is a more modest
one. She argues that there is more perceived legitimacy in criteria that offer an intui-
tively sensible causal explanation than in those that do not. Causal explanations also
suggest the limitations of the usefulness of the criteria and may suggest behavior changes
that could lead to greater overall risk control. See Underwood, supra note 33, at 1444-47.




tion by the Stanford Research Institute found that the schemes
commonly predict no more than thirty percent of losses.
164
There has been considerable debate about that finding's mean-
ing and its implications. 1 5 It only is cited here as further evi-
dence that the illusion of a statistical, scientific system that is a
model of fairness because each pays his own way, is somewhat
removed from reality.
2. Does state law require it?- Proponents of unfettered in-
surer discretion do not stop with saying that fair discrimination
as practiced by insurers is in fact fair. Some also argue that the
use of such classifications is required by state unfair discrimina-
tion statutes.166  Available evidence suggests that this is
incorrect.
The history of state unfair discrimination statutes indicates
that consumers who supported them sought to promote equal
treatment of individuals with a permissible basis for differentia-
tion in statistical association with loss. 6 7 Traditional fair dis-
criminators suggest that unfair discrimination statutes require,
or at least promote, classifications that differentiate between in-
dividuals. This clash in interpretation can be phrased as whether
the unfair discrimination statutes merely forbid the use of clas-
sifiers not statistically associated with loss, or whether they re-
quire, or at least urge, more and more refined classifications,
constrained only by the financial and administrative limitations
on their use.
Typical wordings of state unfair discrimination laws do not re-
quire, or even reflect, policy judgments encouraging the use of
classifications.168 Case law in several states supports this inter-
164. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE FINAL REPORT, 49 (cited in GAO REPORT, supra
note 11, at 116-17).
165. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 117-19.
166. See, e.g., Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 105 n.53. For a
discussion of whether state public accommodation laws might prohibit sex classification,
see Sharp, Insurance as a Public Accommodation: Challenging Gender-Based Actuarial
Tables at the State Level, 15 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 227 (1984).
167. See infra notes 181-249 and accompanying text. The goals of many insurers,
agents, and regulators in supporting such statutes had little to do with concern for any-
thing regarding treatment of consumers. See infra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
168. The New Jersey Insurance Commissioner has emphasized this point. N.J. Order,
supra note 27, at 1068. Three exceptions exist. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0651(6) (West 1984)
(stating that in automobile insurance, "[o]ne rate shall be deemed unfairly discrimina-
tory in relation to another in the same class if it clearly fails to reflect equitably the
differences in expected losses and expenses"); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 58-24-6.1 (Supp.
1985) (defining unfair discrimination as "failure of rates to reflect differences in expected
losses and expenses"); CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03f (West Supp. 1985) (stating that sex clas-
sification in rates mandated where they are "substantially supported by valid pertinent
data segregated by sex in life insurance and annuities").
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pretation16 9 Most1 70 decisional suggestions to the contrary either
have been dictum,' 7' have involved miscitation of previous
cases, 17 2 or have been subsequently repudiated.
73
All American jurisdictions have statutes that forbid unfair dis-
crimination in at least some of the personal lines of insurance. 74
State statutory schemes governing property and casualty insur-
ance, including homeowner's and automobile insurance, usually
include a general standard that rates "not be excessive, inade-
quate or unfairly discriminatory."'1 75 Often, an additional statute
prohibits unfair discrimination "between insureds or property
having like insuring or risk characteristics' 7 or other such lan-
guage. Although some states have moved to open competition
and have curtailed their rate regulatory authority, 77 state rate
approval was the common pattern in property and casualty in-
surance for many years.
7 8
The regulatory framework for life, health, and disability is dif-
ferent because states do not have rate regulation authority in
those areas.17  A common formulation in unfair discrimination
169. See infra notes 207-49 and accompanying text.
170. Only two cases revealed by my research expressed a "fair discrimination" philos-
ophy as a basis for decision that was not expressly or impliedly repudiated by a later
decision. One of these cases did not claim to base its view on an interpretation of the
statutory unfair discrimination requirement but rather an analogy to public utility law.
Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc. v. Bell, 227 Kan. 426, 607 P.2d 498 (1980); see infra notes
231-35 and accompanying text.
The second involved a Florida statute with unique wording and was accompanied by a
strong dissent. State Dep't of Ins. v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984). See supra note 168 and
accompanying text (unique wording of the Florida statute) and infra notes 243-49 (com-
mentary on the case).
171. Century Cab, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 327 Mass. 652, 100 N.E.2d 481
(1951), discussed infra text accompanying notes 214 & 215; Insurance Dep't v. City of
Philadelphia, 196 Pa. Super. 221, 173 A.2d 811 (1961), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 217-18 & 225-26.
172. Century Cab, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 327 Mass. 652, 100 N.E.2d 481
(1951), discussed infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 215-16 & 222-26.
174. A compilation of 128 state statutes is on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF. Individual
state codes often contain multiple references to unfair discrimination. See, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 44-363, 44-365, 44-366, 44-749, 44-1525(7)(a)-(c) (1984).
175. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-356(1) (1975 & Supp. 1984).
176. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.090(c) (1984).
177. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 27-35 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DOJ REPORT].
178. Id. at 15-27.
179. Id. at iii-v, 22-35. As described in more detail later, preferential treatment of
larger and favored types of customers in the rate structure was a source of complaint in
fire insurance. See infra notes 195-96, 198, 204 and accompanying text. This was one of
the pushes to rate regulation. In life insurance, the concern was more preferential treat-
ment of individuals in rebating which was addressed by anti-rebate statutes. See infra
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statutes governing these lines prohibits "discrimination between
individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life"' 80 as
part of unfair trade practice codes governing insurance.
Secondary evidence calls into question the traditional fair dis-
criminators' argument that the intent of statutes prohibiting un-
fair discrimination was to bring about more and more refined
classifications.18' Consumer concern in urging passage of such
statutes seems to have been that people be treated the same, not
that more and more sophisticated methods be developed so that
people could be treated differently.'82
notes 186-94, 197-200 and accompanying text. Life rates may have been perceived to be
controlled adequately by reserve requirements and competition. See infra note 201 and
accompanying text.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's, state rate regulation in fire and casualty insurance
spread to all states through passage of model laws tailored to oust Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion against concerted ratemaking. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. Joint
ratemaking was not common in life, health, and accident insurance, so those industries
saw no reason to fear the Sherman Act and resisted a move to state rate regulatory
authority in a model law. Mertz, The First Twenty Years-A Case-Law Commentary on
Insurance Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 1984 A.B.A. PROC. NEG. AND COMP.
§§ 153, 163. Unfair discrimination prohibitions governing life, health, and disability in-
surance were part of a separate model act enacted by states in the same period. Id. at
171-72. Their purpose was to oust the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 168-73.
180. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-12-11(a) (1975).
181. To gather primary evidence sufficient to make definitive statements on this
point would require research into state legislative archives, biographical material on par-
ticipants, and contemporaneous press accounts. Historian H. Roger Grant used such ma-
terial in writing INSURANCE REFORM: CONSUMER ACTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1979), a
study of life and fire insurance reforms in New York, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, and
Texas from 1885 to 1915. One of my research assistants performed a 50-state survey of
anti-rebate and unfair discrimination statutes, but state codes often do not provide accu-
rate information on the date of original enactment of such statutes. J. STALSON, MARKET-
ING LIFE INSURANCE (1941), provides some information on the history of anti-rebate and
unfair discrimination statutes for life insurance. S. KIMBALL, supra note 119, studies Wis-
consin legislative and judicial action from 1835 through 1959 in detail. E. PATTERSON,
supra note 119, comprehensively analyzes insurance regulation at the time through his
book's publication in 1927. Williams, supra note 111, also contains some information on
the history of unfair discrimination statutes.
182. Writing in the mid-1920's, E. PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 307-10, catalogued
the alleged evils sought to be remedied by forbidding rebating and unfair discrimination.
The first was to prevent someone from acquiring a broker's license just to insure his own
property, although Patterson commented that "[t]he precise evil of such a practice is not
clear." Id. at 307. The second was inadequate rates, but he argued that "in life insurance,
where the reserve is not measured by the premium charge, a company which maintains
this reserve is solvent even if it rebates in order to gain new business." Id. at 308. The
third perceived evil identified was unfair competition, i.e., that the agent who offered
rebates would divert business from the one who did not. He then asked, "But why is this
'unfair' to the latter, in a competitive system?" Id. at 309. Patterson then argued:
It is believed that two social ideals are at the bottom of the anti-rebate and anti-
discrimination laws. The "one-price" idea, firmly rooted in the retail marketing
traditions of the American people, is one .... The second ideal is that of equal-
ity. All insured persons should be treated the same under like circumstances. It
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a. The development of unfair discrimination statutes- Un-
fair discrimination prohibitions were enacted in a number of
states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 183
The background of the prohibitions for life insurance is some-
what different from that for fire insurance. Life and fire insur-
ance were the major lines of personal insurance in that era.
Health insurance was not yet in use.184 Automobiles were just
being invented. The multiple coverage package of howeowner's
insurance was not developed until the 1950's.183
In life insurance, rebating was a common practice. Agents of-
fered to rebate a portion of their commission to potential cus-
tomers or to give some other valuable consideration as an in-
ducement to sale.' s6 The practice was widespread and well-
known.187 It infuriated a number of consumers, 18 and their ire
was one of the pressures for enactment of statutes prohibiting
rebates and forbidding different treatment of people in the same
class and with the same life expectancy.
89
Agents and insurers also were influential in the passage of
anti-rebate and unfair discrimination statutes in life insur-
is unfair to make one man pay more for a thing than another.
Id. at 309. He went on to cite prohibitions on race or color discrimination "regardless of
whether the mortality experience shows an actuarial basis for charging negroes a higher
premium than whites" as an extreme example of this ideal, one "probably motivated by
post bellum sentimentality, though they have their justification in the general tendency
toward 'mutualizing' life insurance-that is, abolishing all distinctions between risks ex-
cept age and normal health." Id. at 309-10.
The General Accounting Office has commented that "most state laws affecting classifi-
cation were enacted long before the classification plans became so sophisticated and
before premiums became so high." GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 128.
183. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
184. See Richardson, The Origin and Development of Group Hospitalization in the
United States, 1890-1940, 20 U. Mo. STUD., 15-18 (1945); Hedinger, The Social Role of
Blue Cross as a Device for Financing the Costs of Hospital Care, HEALTH CARE RE-
SEARCH SERIES, No. 2, Iowa, 6-9 (1966); R. EILEas, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE
SHIELD PLANS 8-9 (1963) (all three pieces cited in S. LAW, BLUE CROSS, WHAT WENT
WRONG? 6 nn.18-19 (1974)).
185. FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL-
OPMENT, FULL INSURANCE AVAILABILITY 21-23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FIA].
186. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 8-10, 77, 104; S. KIMBALL, supra note 119, at 123-
26; J. STALSON, supra note 181, at 535; E. PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 311-21. These
Articles describe some of the variety of inducements termed rebating.
187. Grant quotes an insurance trade journal in the 1880's as saying that rebating in
life insurance "had become 'so general that it may almost be said to be common to all
companies and a majority of agents."' H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 9. He also quotes a
state insurance commissioner as having said in 1905, "No agency could singularly refuse
to grant rebates and long remain in a competitive position .... " Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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ance.' 90 Some agents may have found such practices offensive for
the same reasons as did their customers. Others desired some-
thing to defuse consumer anger.191 It also was claimed that abo-
lition of rebating would professionalize the job of the insurance
agent.192 Finally, agents probably realized that pressure to re-
bate was, in effect, pressure to lower their incomes.193 Insurers
may have shared some of these concerns, but they also disliked
the lack of control of the sales process that the rebate
entailed.
19 4
Rebating was practiced in fire insurance too, but more resent-
ment seemed to focus on rate structures that favored larger con-
sumers with greater bargaining power. 195 Such rates sometimes
were combined with rebates to favored customers.196
Unfair discrimination statutes were enacted more quickly in
life insurance than in fire. By 1895, twenty-five states had life
anti-rebate statutes in place,19 7 as compared with only four fire
statutes by 1910.190 The difference might be explained by the
organized lobbying effort of life underwriters and insurers. 199
The perceived abuses also seem to have been more widespread
in life insurance.
In life insurance, the major concern was the individual dis-
190. In May 1888, the Life Underwriters Association adopted a memorial to all firms
urging them to curb rebating. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 12. At the Association's insis-
tence, John A. McCall, president of New York Life and the former New York Superin-
tendent of Insurance, drafted a life insurance anti-rebate bill. Id. The New York legisla-
ture passed it in 1889. Id. The Wisconsin Life Insurance Agents Association was
instrumental in securing passage of an anti-rebate statute in 1891. Id. The bill was
strongly supported by the powerful Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Milwaukee. Id. at 13-14. The National Association of Life Underwriters endorsed a bill
in 1891 that was the model for many state statutes. Id. at 12. "Association members
played an active role in the adoption of virtually all such legislation." Id.
191. Grant quotes a Missouri agent as having given a "common response" when he
said: "Frankly my clients' anger with the present rebate situation ... frightens me. Some
mornings I expect to see a mob with clubs outside my office." H. GRANT, supra note 181,
at 11.
192. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 12.
193. Kimball says that rebating was only a symptom of the problem of excessive com-
missions. S. KIMBALL, supra note 119, at 124. He argues that "antidiscrimination laws
were helping to shore up a marketing system that in many situations was uneconomic."
Id.
194. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 9. Grant also describes insurers' support for reform
as a desire for a "more orderly and rational business enterprise." Id. at 14.
195. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 77-80, 104, 107.
196. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 77, 104, 107.
197. Williams, supra note 111, at 228.
198. Williams says that the first statute prohibiting unfair personal discrimination
was a Louisiana fire insurance statute passed in 1886. Id.
199. See supra note 190.
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crimination present in rebating rather than the rate structure. 00
A leading authority writing in the 1920's said that life rates gen-
erally were perceived as held in check by legal reserve require-
ments and competition.20 1 The greater concern in fire was group
discrimination in the rate structure.202 Until the Kansas rate
regulatory statute was enacted in 1909,203 most states used anti-
compact statutes, antitrust-type statutes prohibiting ratemaking
agreements, to regulate fire rates.20 " Unfair discrimination
prohibitions were added later as part of rate regulation schemes.
A burst of state legislative activity in the late 1940's and early
1950's brought unfair discrimination prohibitions to all states.
205
This resurgence of interest, however, seems to have been moti-
vated not so much by consumer concern about insurance prac-
tices as by the desire of the insurance industry and state regula-
tors to occupy the field of insurance regulation sufficiently to
avoid application of the federal antitrust laws under the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act. 06
200. E. PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 270.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Williams, supra note 111, at 229. The Kansas statute, the first of its kind, was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court against a challenge on substantive due process
grounds. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). For comments in Ger-
man Alliance about the role of insurance in American society, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 250-58.
204. E. PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 269.
205. Mertz, supra note 179, at 170-71.
206. Until 1944, insurance generally was thought not to be commerce and thus not
subject to regulation under the antitrust laws. In 1944, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), holding insur-
ance to be commerce and thus subject to federal antitrust laws. Congress responded
quickly with prompt passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33
(1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)). The Act exempts the business of in-
surance from the reach of federal laws so long as insurance is regulated by state law in
such a manner that the federal law would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" this state
law. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
and industry representatives immediately formed an All-Industry Committee "to aid in
the formulation of a legislative program to strengthen existing state laws within the
meaning of section 2b of the McCarran Act." Brook, Public Interest and the Commis-
sioners'-All Industry Laws, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 607, 608 n.14 (1950).
Model laws resulted that were enacted by every state. Passage of the model fire and
casualty rating law extended unfair discrimination prohibitions, as part of a general rate
regulation statute, to all states that did not already have such a plan. The model rating
bill was considered necessary to oust the federal Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
The life insurance industry resisted rate regulation. Life and health insurance were made
subject to the model "Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Deceptive
Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance," which included unfair discrimination
prohibitions. Mertz, supra note 179, at 171-72. This legislation was considered necessary
to oust the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b & 21a (1982). Id. at 168-73.
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b. Judicial interpretation of unfair discrimination stat-
utes- State courts have touched only occasionally upon the
objectives of unfair discrimination statutes and the principles
that should guide classification regulation.07 Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania courts are relatively unique because they have
considered these issues several times.20 8 In some early opinions,
each state's courts seemed to interpret unfair discrimination lan-
guage as mandating or encouraging refined classification to avoid
perceived subsidy. These opinions, however, did not provide
much analysis of the basis for this interpretation. The most re-
cent decisions in both states have said that other values properly
may supersede statistical association with loss in a classification
scheme.20 9
In Brest v. Commissioner of Insurance,210 decided in 1930, in-
sureds argued that territorial classification in automobile insur-
ance violated the nondiscrimination standard in the Massachu-
setts statute. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected that
interpretation, stating classification was permissible if statistical
evidence supported it.2 1I Five years later in Schlabach v. Com-
missioner of Insurance,1 2 an insured who lived in the Boston
Navy Yard argued that reclassification of the Yard so it was
rated with the city of Boston violated the statutory nondiscrimi-
nation standard. The Massachusetts high court held that such
207. LEXIS searches were conducted using "discrim! w/7 class! or rate w/9 insurance
and unfair," "class! w/8 risk or rate w/seg insurance w/15 discrim!," and "actuarial! w/15
sound or justifl. w/seg insurance and discrim!" using the federal and state reporter librar-
ies. Through December 1984, this produced 373 citations, with some duplication of cases.
Additional searches were conducted in the Commerce Clearing House Automobile Re-
porter, Fire and Casualty Reporter, and Life and Health Reporter, which checked "can-
cellation," "classification," "definitions," "discrimination," "rate," "refusal," "renewal,"
"risk," and "selection." A research assistant also used the West state and federal digests
extensively, but there is no record of the key numbers checked. In addition, cases cited
in other cases and in law review articles were checked. Though many cases were re-
viewed, few included any discussion of construction of the unfair discrimination statutes
or standards for approval of classifications.
208. See infra notes 210-26 & 236-39 and accompanying text. There also has been
extensive litigation on the insurance commissioner's authority in North Carolina, but the
issues of concern here have not been discussed during North Carolina's litigation in any
detail. See Note, Insurance Law-Changes in Automobile Rate Regulation and the Role
of the Insurance Commissioner in North Carolina-State ex. rel. Commissioner of In-
surance v. North Carolina State Bureau, 17 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 822 (1981). There also
have been several Florida cases, the most recent of which is discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 243-49.
209. For the development of case law in Massachusetts, see infra text accompanying
notes 210-16 & 238-39. For the development of case law in Pennsylvania, see infra text
accompanying notes 217-26.
210. 270 Mass. 7, 169 N.E. 657 (1930).
211. 270 Mass. at 18, 169 N.E. at 661.
212. 290 Mass. 585, 195 N.E. 887 (1935).
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reclassification was permissible even if the Navy Yard had a
more favorable loss record.
Brest is consistent with interpreting unfair discrimination
statutes to require that classifications used have a statistical as-
sociation with loss.2 13 Nothing in Brest or Schlabach said there
was an affirmative duty on the Commissioner, who was actually
setting the rates in Massachusetts, to seek classification that
measured differences in loss as precisely as possible. In
Schlabach, the court rejected the claim that classification had to
reflect all available information about differences in loss.
Unfortunately, in 1951 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court cited Brest and Schlabach as support for language sug-
gesting an affirmative duty in the Commissioner to seek classifi-
cations such that each pays his own way. The court in this case,
Century Cab, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance, said that state
law required that risks "be equitably adjusted and proportioned
among the classes with the respective losses which reasonably
are to be anticipated, '1 14 citing Brest and Schlabach with no ex-
planation as to how this conclusion was drawn from these cases.
The holding of Century Cab was only that it was permissible to
use average rates for some taxicab owners and experience rates
based on individual experience for others. The comment on the
statute's intent was dictum and considerably expanded the hold-
ings of Brest and Schlabach.
In 1981, the Massachusetts high court said that it was reaffirm-
ing the previously quoted language but went on to approve a
state commissioner's order that held other values to outweigh
statistical association with loss. 1 5 The state rating bureau chal-
lenged the allocation of losses in the state reinsurance pool
among all state insureds rather than fixing rates in the pool
purely on the experience of the insureds within it. The court
said the Commissioner could do so because his mandate in-
cluded ensuring reasonableness in rates as well as nondiscrimi-
nation. Thus, he could consider the "legislative policy of making
motor vehicle insurance available to all, including high risk driv-
ers," in allocating losses among the classifications.16
Pennsylvania appellate courts' first experience with a classifi-
cation case produced some language reflecting a traditional fair
discrimination interpretation of the unfair discrimination stat-
213. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
214. 327 Mass. 652, 663, 100 N.E.2d 481, 488 (1951).
215. Massachusetts Auto Rating Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 384 Mass. 333, 424
N.E.2d 1127 (1981).
216. 384 Mass. at 346, 424 N.E.2d at 1135.
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utes. In 1961, in Insurance Department v. City of Philadelphia,
Philadelphia challenged the state Commissioner's approval of a
rate filing raising the rates for property insurance in the city.
21 7
The superior court said that the rate increase was needed to rec-
tify unfair discrimination in favor of Philadelphia residents and
against those elsewhere in the state.218
Thirteen years later, the commonwealth court considered a
case in which the Commissioner had disapproved a flat one dol-
lar charge for the first month's premium in an industrial health
policy regardless of the risk insured.2 9 Although the Commis-
sioner seemed to have been concerned primarily with the poten-
tial bait and switch nature of the scheme, he had held that it
was unfair discrimination to charge the same rates to "persons
in different rating classifications. '"220 The court upheld this de-
termination saying it was discriminatory to charge equal rates
for diverse policies sold to diverse risks.221
In two more recent decisions, however, the Pennsylvania
courts have joined Massachusetts in holding that other values
may outweigh statistical association loss. In Capitol Blue Cross
v. Commonwealth Insurance Department,222 Blue Cross and
Blue Shield failed in a challenge to the Commissioner's require-
ment that supplemental policies for those over sixty-five include
a community rating factor rather than having rates depend on
the experience of that classification alone. In 1982, the common-
wealth court considered the Commissioner's prohibition of gen-
der as a factor in automobile insurance.223 The court stated:
"Capitol Blue Cross, by holding that actuarial soundness cannot
be the sole test of validity of a rate, established that actuarial
justification does not operate without limit.' '224 The court dis-
missed the fair discrimination language of Insurance Depart-
ment v. City of Philadelphia,225 stating that the case "does not
stand for any contrary proposition by virtue of the dictum
therein, that continuation of the old rates favoring Philadelphia
217. 196 Pa. Super. 221, 173 A.2d 811 (1961).
218. 196 Pa. Super. at 229, 235, 242, 173 A.2d at 815, 818, 821.
219. Physicians' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Denenberg, 15 Pa. Commw. 509, 327 A.2d 415
(1974).
220. 15 Pa. Commw. at 516, 327 A.2d at 419.
221. Id.
222. 34 Pa. Commw. 584, 383 A.2d 1306 (1978). Community rating refers to the origi-
nal philosophy of Blue Cross plans that all hospital insurance be offered at two uniform
rates, one for individuals and one for families. S. LAW, supra note 184, at 12.
223. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 442
A.2d 382, afl'd, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542 (1984).
224. 65 Pa. Commw. at 255-56, 442 A.2d at 385.
225. 196 Pa. Super. 221, 173 A.2d 811 (1961).
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could have violated an 'unfairly discriminatory' standard. The
principal thrust of that case was to affirm the Commissioner's
exercise of discretion under the statute . "...226
Two other states have rejected challenges analogous to the one
raised in Schlabach, namely that unfair discrimination statutes
reflect a concern that all classifications having a statistical asso-
ciation with loss should be used. In 1932, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that unfair discrimination statutes permitted Aetna
Life Insurance to charge a flat rate for credit life insurance to all
borrowers between twenty-one and fifty-nine despite their dif-
ferent life expectancies.22  The court held that the unfair dis-
crimination statute required only that people of the same age be
treated the same, not that people of different ages be treated
differently.
228
The highest Virginia court upheld the state Commissioner's
rejection of a company's request for a twenty-five percent reduc-
tion from Bureau property insurance premiums for policies writ-
ten for druggists.22 9 Although not questioning the contention
that the druggists might have a better loss ratio, the Commis-
sioner and the court refused to permit the lower rate. This case
exemplifies the anticompetitive effects of rigid rejection of devi-
ations from Bureau rates, 230 but it supports the argument that
unfair discrimination statutes were not meant to require that
each pay his own way.
A Kansas case offers support for the traditional fair discrimi-
nators' interpretation of unfair discrimination statutes.231 The
court based its opinion, however, not on the text or legislative
history of the statute but merely on the court's view of desirable
public policy. On facts similar to those in Capitol Blue Cross v.
Commonwealth Insurance Department,232 the Kansas Insurance
Commissioner had denied Kansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield's
proposal to eliminate the community rating factor previously
used in supplemental coverage for Medicare and Medicaid recip-
ients and to make them self-sustaining. The court quoted a stan-
226. 65 Pa. Commw. at 256, 442 A.2d at 385-86.
227. Greer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 225 Ala. 121, 142 So. 393 (1932).
228. 225 Ala. at 123, 142 So. at 395.
229. American Druggists' Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 275, 110 S.E.2d 509
(1959); see Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance Industry as a Case Study in the Workabil-
ity of Regulated Competition, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 199, 210-11 (1958).
230. See Comment, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Re-
form, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (1976).
231. Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc. v. Bell, 227 Kan. 426, 607 P.2d 498 (1980).




dard that had been applied to public utility rates: "'[T]he rule
that one class of consumers shall not be burdened with costs cre-
ated by another class.' "238 The court continued: "We believe
this same philosophy should be applied in fixing rates for differ-
ent groups of health care subscribers .... Although this re-
flects an endorsement of the each pay his own way philosophy,
the court did not claim that its decision was based on an inter-
pretation of an insurance unfair discrimination statute. The
court cited a treatise on public utility ratemaking and simply
said that this principle should apply in insurance as well.
2385
Courts also periodically have addressed whether the unfair
discrimination statutes should be read to require more than sta-
tistical association with loss as a condition for permitting a clas-
sification based on some considerations such as causality. As
long ago as 1930, insureds complained that only causal classifica-
tions should be permitted.2 3 6 In Brest v. Commissioner of Insur-
ance,237 the petitioner argued that the place of garaging was not
the cause of the accidents and thus should not be a permissible
classification for rating purposes.23 8 The court said that the un-
fair discrimination statute did not require that a classification be
the cause of loss, but only that the two be statistically associ-
ated.23 9 On the other hand, in 1953 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court considered causality extensively in a case challenging race
as a proper classification for the state life insurance program.240
The court ruled that race could not be used because it did not
offer a causal explanation for the mortality difference between
blacks and whites.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently considered the is-
sue of causality and rejected the insurer's contention that the
legislature was concerned only with statistical association with
loss in the unfair discrimination statutes .2 4 The court quoted
with approval from a National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (NAIC) Task Force Report on automobile rating,
which was never approved by the NAIC, stating: "'[Plublic pol-
233. 227 Kan. at 439, 607 P.2d at 508.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Brest v. Commissioner of Ins., 270 Mass. 7, 169 N.E. 657 (1930).
237. 270 Mass. 7, 169 N.E. 657 (1930).
238. 270 Mass. at 16, 169 N.E. at 660.
239. Id.
240. Lange v. Rancher, 262 Wis. 625, 56 N.W.2d 542 (1953). For discussion of the
Wisconsin state life insurance plan, see infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
241. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 571, 579, 482
A.2d 542, 546 (1984).
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icy considerations require more adequate justification for rating
factors than simple statistical correlation with loss; . . . such as
causality, reliability, social acceptability and incentive value in
judging the reasonableness of a classification system.' ,242
A Florida court took a contrary view on causality, rejecting
the state insurance Commissioner's ban on the use of sex, mari-
tal status, and scholastic achievement as automobile insurance
rating factors .24 3 The Insurance Department had rejected these
rating factors, stating that they had no direct or indirect causal
connection to expected loss. 2" The court held that the fairness
and equity of a classification must be judged by predictive accu-
racy alone.2 45 A lengthy dissent argued that this was an overly
narrow view of the Commissioner's discretion 46 and that the In-
surance Department should be able to employ "normative stan-
dards of 'fairness' to sharpen its scrutiny into the claimed pre-
dictive accuracy of the suspect classifications. 2 47 Interestingly,
the court stated that the evidence regarding the actuarial sound-
ness of these factors was "overwhelming" even though there was
no statistical evidence in the record regarding scholastic achieve-
ment.248 The decision turned on the Florida statute's particular
language and legislative history. It should be of limited interest
to other jurisdictions because Florida is one of only three states
with a statute encouraging classification rather than merely
prohibiting classifications not statistically associated with loss.2 49
In summary, examination of traditional fair discrimination in
theory and practice reveals it not to be particularly fair to the
public, nor generally required or encouraged by state unfair dis-
crimination laws. With its customary justification thus eroded,
traditional fair discrimination presents a far less formidable ob-
stacle than commonly assumed to arguments that values other
than statistical association with loss should be considered in reg-
ulating insurance classification. To the degree to which statisti-
cal association with loss remains a value, a more precise defini-
242. 505 Pa. at 584, 482 A.2d at 548.
243. Dep't of Ins. v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984).
244. 434 So.2d at 912.
245. Id. at 912-13.
246. Id. at 914.
247. Id. at 924.
248. Id. at 913.
249. See supra note 168 for the citation to and the text of the Florida statute as well
as the wording of the other two state statutes that suggest an encouragement of classifi-




tion than group average should be required.
C. An Alternative Perspective: The Importance of Insurance
in American Society
Case law, commentary, and public dialogue on insurance often
refer to the industry's special nature and a consequent public
interest. In 1913 in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas,2 50
the United States Supreme Court upheld a state's right to regu-
late fire insurance rates by finding insurance "affected with a
public interest. '25 1 The Court's exploration of the "peculiar rela-
tion to the public interest" 252 of insurance identified several
grounds to justify the regulation.
First, the Court reasoned that the long history and pervasive
nature of state government regulation of insurance was itself evi-
dence of a strong public interest.2 5s Second, the Court took no-
tice of insurance's function to distribute loss as widely as possi-
ble, which lessens the burden of catastrophes on particular
individuals and communities.2 5' Third, the role of fire insurance
in protecting the nation's wealth was cited.255 Fourth, the Court
called insurance "practically a necessity to business activity and
enterprise" because of its relation to credit.
2 56
Finally, specifically justifying rate regulation, the Court sug-
gested that rate setting by "councils of underwriters" was akin
to a monopolistic process with no opportunity for bargaining by
insureds.3 7 The Court went on to say that the public should be
protected from "arbitrary terms," as was the case with regard to
250. 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
251. Id. at 408.
252. Id. at 411.
253. Id. at 412; see E. PATTERSON, supra note 119, at 513-37 app. (setting forth his-
tory of insurance regulation in Europe and the United States). Professor Patterson cites
insurance legislation in Genoa in the last quarter of the 14th century, id. at 514 n.10, a
comprehensive insurance code in Barcelona in 1435, id. at 515 n.14, and an administra-
tive body to regulate insurance in Florence in 1523, id. at 515 n.16. The Florentine body
was empowered to fix premium rates "'provided they conform themselves to equitable
regulation in the matter.' " Id. at 515. Patterson said over half a century ago that "mod-
ern rate-making statutes have added but little to this formula in the way of exactness."
Id. Little if any more has been added since 1927. See supra notes 115-65 and accompa-
nying text on the minimal standards required by state law and supra notes 207-49 and
accompanying text on the small number of cases interpreting the requirements of unfair
discrimination statutes.
254. 233 U.S. at 412-13.
255. Id. at 413.
256. Id. at 414.
257. Id. at 416.
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common carriers, public accommodations, and weights and
measures.
258
The notion of a special public interest in insurance was in-
voked by life insurers in the early twentieth century to claim
that they should be exempt from taxation.259 Some commenta-
tors have argued that the law should consider insurance a public
utility, but have failed to offer comprehensive discussions of this
treatment's basis or implications.260
Although allusions to the special nature and public interest in
insurance are relatively frequent, legal commentary offers little
in terms of a theoretical framework for the nature of the insur-
ance enterprise and the considerations that should govern its
regulation.261 Although such a framework is needed, an endeavor
of that scope is not attempted here. This Article develops a per-
spective on insurance classification that arises from the role of
the personal lines of insurance in American society and govern-
ment choices that have affected that role. It then argues that
there should be a resulting public obligation to be concerned
258. Id. at 417.
259. Grant quotes a 1908 editorial in the insurance journal, the Spectator:
The beneficent work accomplished by life... insurance companies should entitle
them to the most liberal possible consideration at the hands of legislators; for
the encouragement of such insurance is one of the surest means of avoiding pub-
lic expense for almshouses, jails, etc. Surely, a tax upon insurance is a tax upon
thrift; and, having a tendency to make insurance unduly expensive, operates to
discourage prudence and forethought on the part of the citizens of our country.
H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 69.
260. See, e.g., Denenberg, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities: An Industry
in Revolution, 1970 INS. L.J. 205, 210-11; Comment, Insurance Rate Regulation in Penn-
sylvania: Does the Consumer Have a Voice?, 81 DICK. L. REV. 297, 303-06 (1977); Senate
Hearings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 169 (testimony of Tom O'Day, Assistant Vice
President of the Alliance of American Insurers, disputing the appropriateness of an anal-
ogy to public utilities); H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 128-29 (referring to modified rate
control legislation drafted by a Wisconsin state legislative committee based on the con-
cept of fire insurance as a public utility); Kimball & Boyce, supra note 119, at 546 (com-
menting on insurance rate regulation as "much less sophisticated and thorough than
public utility rate regulation"); see also Lamel, State Regulation of the Insurance In-
dustry, 1978 INS. L.J. 336, 341 (arguing that a balance should be struck between the
"total supervision" of a public utility and "permitting latitude for private enterprise to
make its own business decisions"); Works, supra note 20, at 478 & n.73 (commenting
that contrary to the approach with regard to public utilities, "availability traditionally
has not been made an official member of the spectrum of primary regulatory values").
261. The best such commentary is Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471 (1961). In-
surance law scholar Robert Keeton has offered objectives for regulation that he says are
suggested by government-sponsored programs of insurance. R. KEETON, CASES & MATERI-
ALS ON BASIC INSURANCE LAW 1022-29 (1977). Keeton's definition of government sponsor-
ship includes coercing the use of private insurers to provide insurance. Id. at 1022.
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with legitimacy of classifications 2' 2 used by insurers and availa-
bility of insurance.6 3
1. The needs insurance fills and public choices about how to
meet those needs- Government-sponsored social insurance
plays an important role in compensating the victims of automo-
bile accidents in some other countries. 2 4 Although many states
have changed from a fault based to a no-fault system, the
United States has maintained its reliance on the private insur-
ance system as a way to recompense damage caused by automo-
biles. Japan and Western Europe use private insurers as well but
do not use a refined classification scheme like that found in the
United States.
265
About half the states require liability insurance indemnifying
the driver in case of suit by injured parties.26 The potential cost
of a damage award makes liability insurance a necessity for any-
one concerned about preservation of assets. Collision insurance
protecting the insured's own vehicle is a requirement for ob-
taining a loan secured by the vehicle being purchased.
More legislation has restricted classification discretion in au-
tomobile insurance than in any other personal line of insur-
ance. 2 7 Most states have developed a method to insure those
who cannot buy insurance in the private market.26 s The Michi-
262. As a stimulus to thinking about the concept of "legitimacy" in classification, the
author acknowledges Underwood, supra note 33.
263. The author acknowledges the excellent Article by Works, supra note 20, for help
in developing her thoughts concerning availability.
264. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 189-219
(1965).
265. FIA, supra note 185, at 69-72.
266. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
267. Four states have banned the use of gender classification in auto insurance, while
only one has done so in all lines. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Men
benefit from prohibiting gender classification in auto and life insurance while women
benefit in health, disability, and annuities. Although one is tempted to ascribe the regu-
latory enthusiasm regarding automobile insurance to the benefits men receive from the
elimination of gender classification, there are probably a number of other factors as well.
The primary concern in automobile insurance is not the insured but liability to third
parties. The fact that automobile insurance is often required has been considered impor-
tant. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. Many states have more elaborate state
code provisions concerning automobile insurance than other lines.
268. Austin, supra note 11, at 522 n.23, outlines and explains the three methods gen-
erally used: assigned risk plans, reinsurance facilities, and joint underwriting associa-
tions. She says that insurers cooperated in the formation of such schemes because they
"[f]ear[ed] restrictions on their profit-maximizing practices or competition from rival
state-run schemes subsidized by tax revenues." Id. at 521 & n.21 and authorities cited.
The cost of such methods may be quite high. A study by the Federal Insurance Adminis-
tration published in 1974 found that rates for insureds in assigned risk plans averaged
45% higher than similar drivers insured in the voluntary market. FIA, supra note 185, at
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gan Supreme Court has reasoned that the requirement of auto-
mobile insurance as a condition of automobile registration im-
poses constitutional limits on the use of classifications.2 69
German Alliance found one basis for a public concern regard-
ing fire insurance in its requirement for extension of credit.
2 70
Fire insurance is still a condition for obtaining a mortgage.2 71 In
1968, the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in
Riot-Affected Areas documented the relation of unavailability of
insurance in urban areas to the decline of the urban core 272 This
concern prompted federal legislation.
The Urban Property Protection and Riot Reinsurance Act of
1968 authorized urban riot reinsurance, then much desired by
the insurance industry, if states would set up pools of insurance
companies, called FAIR plans, to provide insurance to those de-
nied by the private market.273 FAIR plans proved important not
only for those in the inner city but also for people in rural areas
and areas with low property values who had difficulty obtaining
property insurance.2 74 This legislation has now been allowed to
lapse,2 75 although many states have maintained FAIR plans. 6
269. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 934 (1979) (criticized in Austin, supra note 11, at 531-33).
270. See supra text accompanying note 256.
271. See Austin, supra note 11, at 520 n.10 (citing the requirements of property in-
surance for loans guaranteed by the Veterans Administration and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development).
272. See HUGHES PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 115 app.
273. Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1211-1224, 82 Stat. 476, 558-63 (1968) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3 to § 1749bbb-10 (1982)). FAIR is an acronym for fair access to insur-
ance requirements. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(a) (1982). In most states, the insurance
through such pools was similar in cost to that available to insureds with similar proper-
ties. A few states had places where rates were dramatically higher in such pools. Concern
with such arrangements lead to passage of the "Holtzman Amendment," which provided
that rates in FAIR plans could not be higher than the rates established by state rating
bureaus for the voluntary market. Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2097 (1978) (amending 12
U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3(b)(11) (Supp. V 1981)), repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. III, § 342(b),
95 Stat. 420 (1981) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb-3(b)(11) (West Supp. 1985)). The
property/casualty industry was violently opposed to this amendment. Eleven states
opted to forgo federal reinsurance rather than comply. Allstate Insurance and the Conti-
nentai Insurance Group, two of the nation's largest insurers, pulled out of FAIR plans in
states in which participation was not required. See Austin, supra note 11, at 527 & nn.
49-50 and authorities cited therein.
274. Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1131-32 (1978).
275. The riot reinsurance program terminated on Nov. 30, 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-181,
§ 452(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1153, 1230 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb(b)(1) (West Supp.
1985)).
276. Robert Hunter, Director of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, esti-
mates that half the states still have such programs. Telephone interview with Robert
Hunter (Feb. 22, 1985).
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The federal government took a direct action to assure some
availability of insurance against burglary in some urban areas in
passage of the Federal Crime Insurance Act.277
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was
support in some states278 for government-run fire insurance re-
sembling municipal insurance schemes in Germany279 as an al-
ternative to the publicly regulated private company system that
evolved instead.2 80 Insurance companies vigorously opposed such
initiatives with cries of "socialistic" and "harmful to society.
2 81
No government fire schemes were enacted,2 82 although a number
of mutuals patterned on German and Scandinavian models were
organized. 83
Development of health insurance generally did not begin until
the 1920's.284 The need for such protection has increased as costs
have accelerated. In 1983, health expenditures were $355.4 bil-
lion, 10.8% of the gross national product.2 85 This compares to
$103.4 billion, 7.8% of the gross national product, ten years
earlier.
28 6
The United States has rejected schemes to guarantee univer-
sal health care or health insurance. In response to calls for a na-
tional health scheme, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners drafted a Model Act establishing a reinsurance
pool administered by private carriers to provide coverage for
277. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb-10a (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
278. Grant describes efforts in Missouri, Wisconsin, and Kansas. H. GRANT, supra
note 181, at 78-79, 94-96, 122-24, 142. He describes concerns for high rates in Missouri.
Id. at 78-79, 122-24. Wisconsin initiatives seem to have grown from a concern for stabil-
ity evinced by company failures after the great Chicago fire of 1871. Id. at 94-96. Kansas
Insurance Commissioner Webb McNall favored state-operated fire insurance because he
believed it would lower costs and keep financial resources in the state. Id. at 142.
279. Id. at 78.
280. Many states ultimately enacted rate regulation schemes similar to the Kansas
statutes upheld by the Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389
(1914). See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
281. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 95.
282. Wisconsin enacted a scheme of self-insurance for public buildings but did not
pass a public scheme for insuring private property. Id. at 95-96.
283. Id. at 96. Many of these mutuals ultimately grew to be huge concerns with much
control by policyholders. See generally Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders,
Pt. 2: The Role of the Policyholder in Mutual Insurance Companies: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Role of the
Policyholder].
284. See S. LAW, supra note 184, at 6.
285. Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REv., Winter 1984, at 1, 3 (Table 1) [hereinafter cited as Gibson).
286. Id.
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those who would not be covered voluntarily.2 ' 7 As of 1978, only
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Minnesota had adopted such schemes
although they permit rates considerably higher than those for
people insured by insurers voluntarily. 288 Health benefits are
funded by the federal government through Medicaid, the Public
Health Service and other programs for poor people, the Defense
Department for active military personnel and the Veteran's Ad-
ministration for retired military personnel, the Indian Health
Service for Native Americans, and Medicare for those receiving
social security retirement and disability benefits.289 For most
other Americans, public policy choices have encouraged an em-
ployer-provided system of health care.
The tax system allows employers to deduct from their taxable
income all moneys contributed to employee health benefits, and
employees do not have to pay taxes on these funds.s90 Health
benefits are an attractive way of providing compensation. Em-
ployers bear three-quarters of the cost of health insurance pre-
miums in the United States. 9 '
Those in employer-provided health plans benefit in ways
other than through the tax advantage. Group insurance is
cheaper than similar benefits in an individual policy because the
cost of selling multiple policies is eliminated and because em-
ployers often take up some of the cost of processing claims. Clas-
sifications usually are not used in employer-sponsored plans. All
eligible employees are accepted regardless of characteristics such
as age, sex, and health.292
One could criticize the existing system because it ties people
287. Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652, 664
& n.67 (1978). The Model Act is addressed to those "uninsurable" in the private market.
If costs were not subsidized externally or shared broadly among the state's insureds, high
rates could make insurance from such pools unaffordable for many. See supra note 268
regarding the high cost of automobile insurance in residual market mechanisms.
288. Okin, supra note 287, at 664.
289. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
290. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1982) (allowing for deduction of ordinary and necessary
business expenses); 26 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (allowing exclusion from employee's gross in-
come of contributions by employers to accident and health plans).
291. Gibson, supra note 285, at 5.
292. The only common restrictions regard coverage of some services such as treat-
ment of pre-existing illnesses, psychiatric counseling, and cosmetic surgery. The contro-
versy over exclusion of pregnancy coverage from employer-sponsored plans led to the
decisions in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976). After the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert, which held that such
a practice was not sex discrimination, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, amending the definition of sex discrimination




to employers if they wish to ensure the availability of health in-
surance and health care.2 93 This Article's concern, however, is for
those who do not have access to an employer-sponsored plan.
These people include the unemployed, the self-employed, and
those with employers too small or unwilling to provide health
benefits.294
It has been charged that the third-party system for health in-
surance, at least in part, caused the spiralling cost of health
care. 21 If this is true, the person without access to an employer-
sponsored plan is disadvantaged in yet another way. She does
not receive the same tax subsidies for her health insurance as
someone insured in an employer-sponsored plan. She has to buy
an individual policy that is more expensive than a group policy.
She is more likely to find it difficult to buy insurance or to be
subject to coverage restrictions. If she chooses or is compelled by
price to be uninsured, she faces health care costs inflated by a
third-party payment system in which health care consumers and
health care providers have little incentive to contain costs.
Social security serves some of the same functions as private
life and disability insurance. Social security survivors and disa-
bility benefits provide income for qualified dependents, but the
income provided is modest and there are a number of restric-
tions on coverage.2 96 Those who wish to preserve a middle-class
life style for their families in the event of the breadwinner's
death or disability still need private life and disability insurance.
As in fire insurance, 97 there were efforts to institute govern-
ment-run life insurance in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.2 98 Wisconsin was the only state to enact such a
scheme. 299 It did so despite the same claims of socialism and
drastic predictions about the consequences to society300 that de-
293. From the left, it might be criticized for encouraging people to be capitalist wage
slaves. From the right, it might be criticized for dampening incentives for striking out on
one's own with an entrepreneurial venture.
294. This assumes that such people do not have insurance coverage through another
family member and are not eligible for the government-provided programs included in
supra note 14. A citizens' committee headed by Arthur Flemming, former Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, has estimated recently that 33 million Americans lack
access to public or private health insurance. U.S. Is Faulted on Health Care, Wash.
Post, Oct. 18, 1984, at A18, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Faulted on Health Care].
295. Gibson, supra note 285, at 5. Unnecessary surgery, tests, and other procedures
are likely to be responsible as well.
296. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
298. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 60-64.
299. Id. at 63.
300. Id.
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feated publicly sponsored fire insurance.30' Massachusetts estab-
lished a semi-public Savings Bank Life Insurance System in
1907.302 It still exists but has modest coverage limits.
303
2. Implications that should flow from insurance as a neces-
sity and public choice to use private insurance to meet this
need- The personal lines of insurance fulfill vital needs for the
majority of Americans. Public choices have been made to meet
these needs through the private insurance mechanism. Public
choices also have had significant effects on the distribution of
insurance availability from private insurers throughout the pop-
ulation. This combination of necessity and public choice creates
an obligation on behalf of society to be concerned about the le-
gitimacy of the classification schemes used by insurers to decide
who can buy insurance, how much it will cost, and who will be
covered. The antidiscrimination perspective provides powerful
answers to questions about the legitimacy of some classifications
but fails to offer a sufficient framework for evaluating all
classifications.
3 0 4
Consideration of the role of insurance in society, as well as the
public choices that have shaped that role, leads one not only to a
concern for perceived legitimacy of classifications but also to the
more important issue of availability of coverage: Can people buy
the insurance they need?
A national study should be made of who cannot obtain insur-
ance because a policy cannot be purchased at any price (an un-
derwriting decision), the price is unaffordable (a rating decision),
or the particular coverage is unobtainable or unaffordable (a
coverage decision) . ° On occasion, public attention has focused
on availability with regard to a particular group of people and a
particular line of insurance. In the late 1960's, the Hughes Com-
mission directed attention to property insurance for inner-city
residents. 0 6 In the 1981-83 recession, there was discussion of a
public solution for those who lost their health insurance along
with their jobs.307 The specificity of such foci obscures considera-
tion of the general limitations of the private insurance mecha-
301. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
302. H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 63.
303. See infra note 333 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 93-103, infra notes 347-60 and accompanying text.
305. See infra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 12.
307. In 1983, the House of Representatives passed a bill, H.R. 3021, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), to aid unemployed workers in obtaining health insurance and health care,
but the bill did not pass the Senate. Backing for Jobless Health Insurance Wanes, 39
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 405 (1983).
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nism as it operates in this country. It also allows society to ig-
nore an important question: Whom is society willing to leave
uninsured?
308
Focusing only on ways to increase availability, such as restrict-
ing classification, allows society to avoid confronting what insur-
ance unavailability it will tolerate. The choice of ways to address
unavailability should consider the amount of cost redistribution
involved in broader pooling of risks, attitudes about the specific
classification, and perceptions about the importance of the line
of insurance and the coverage in question.
If the cost shifts of restricting classification are relatively mi-
nor, this becomes a more palatable alternative. For example, if
eliminating residence zip code as a classifier would cost each in-
sured in a state only a few dollars more, it is reasonable to take
this step if it makes insurance available to some who otherwise
could not buy it at all.309 Because the classification process is
sufficiently imprecise, eliminating a classifier does not necessa-
rily do great violence to a scientific process.
Whether society is willing to require that particular insureds
be included in pools may depend on its views about the classifi-
cation. Thus, it may seem unfair to restrict the ability of dis-
abled people to buy insurance but acceptable to require that
smokers pay the higher costs justified by their self-destructive
behavior. Conversely, if society perceives health insurance as
sufficiently important, we may determine that offering health in-
surance to smokers only at a prohibitive cost goes too far. It may
be concluded that some higher cost is all right but not the full
cost differential that might be suggested by use of the smoking
classifier alone if that differential would result in unaffordability
for many. At the same time, refusing to sell automobile insur-
ance to people with three moving traffic violations may be palat-
able even though past violations are limited in their predictive
validity about future accidents.
Once a decision is made that a gap in availability should be
closed, there are at least three approaches to doing so. Classifica-
tion discretion can be limited by placing the additional cost of
308. See Works, supra note 20, at 524, on the avoidance of the issue of minimum
standards for insurability in the design of the federal FAIR plan schemes.
309. In the late 1970's, New York, unlike most other states, administered its FAIR
Plan so that rates were based on the losses of those properties in the plan. J. Com., Sept.
15, 1978, at 1, col. 3. It was estimated that a proposal to bring those rates to market rates
would add only $2.50 to a $150 insurance policy. See letter from Francis V. Reilly, Fed-
eral Insurance Administration, to the Author (Aug. 4, 1977) (copy on file with U. MICH.
J.L. REF.).
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insuring those who would otherwise be uninsured on the pool of
those buying insurance. In other words, the insurance pool is
broadened. Another choice leaves insurance classification discre-
tion unfettered but subsidizes the extra cost for some insureds
from public funds.310 A third choice assures that all can
purchase insurance but allows all or most of the cost of those
perceived to be higher risk to fall on that group. In other words,
classification is restricted in underwriting and coverage but not
in rating. Many assigned risk pools take this approach and
therefore have much higher rates than the private market.
Within any one of these three approaches, how much might be
done through private insurers and what role government might
play could vary considerably.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest in which lines
of insurance, and for which classifications, availability gaps
should not be permitted and to suggest precisely how to bridge
those gaps. Some classification restriction is proposed but not
primarily because of its impact on availability. The availability
study proposal would look at availability both before implemen-
tation of the suggested classificaton restrictions and after two
years of experience with them." '1
D. Another Alternative Perspective: Competition in the
Insurance Market
The other overlooked perspective on the classification debate
is the possible salutary effect on competition of restricting insur-
ers' discretion in classification. Competition supposedly creates
"reasonable prices based on the cost of rendering the services;
efficiency in which the services are rendered at the lowest possi-
ble cost; and innovation in which new or improved products or
services and methods of distribution are utilized."3 ' Writings
about government intervention affecting classification generally
have ignored the almost unique nature of competition in the in-
surance market and the consequence which those unique fea-
310. See, e.g., Benston, Economics of Gender Discrimination, supra note 31, at 512
(so argues even with regard to race classification). Contra, Austin, supra note 11, at 521
(suggests that insurers have cooperated with state regulators in residual market mecha-
nisms for automobile insurance from a fear of greater government regulation and of com-
petition from subsidized schemes).
311. See infra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
312. DOJ REPORT, supra note 177, at 2-3.
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tures might have for decisions about appropriate regulation.313
One notable exception outlines four possible kinds of competi-
tion that can take place among insurers. " " Economists and those
interested in efficiency in public policy revere the first type,
competition by adjustment of price and service. Product differ-
entiation, which can result in a proliferation of minor differences
in product, is a second possibility." 5 Product differentiation as a
mode of competition, of course, is not unique to insurance. Prod-
uct differentiation as a mode of competition may allow sellers to
meet discrete needs and establish good will in their products. At
the same time, it can substitute for beneficial price competition
and confuse customers. Product differentiation is more common
and prone to more negative consequences in the insurance in-
dustry than in some others because of the difficulty of making
price and quality comparisons about insurance. 3 '6 The insurance
product is presented to the public as a complex written docu-
ment. Most people have difficulty ascertaining the differences
among insurance policies and more difficulty understanding
their implications. Quality judgments about insurance would re-
late to a company's financial stability and claims settlement
practices, but this information is not readily available to a
consumer.
The third kind of competition occurs among insurers for loy-
alty and diligence of sales intermediaries. Independent agents
sell much insurance. Insurers can compete by offering better
commissions to agents.3 17 Because the product is very compli-
cated to understand, agents can convince people to buy a prod-
uct that offers the most beneficial commission to the agent as
opposed to the best buy for the customer. 38
313. For example, Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 229, at 205, say that "[clompetition
in insurance, as in all types of businesses, may take three forms: (1) service, (2) product
(policy), and (3) price (premium rates)." They do not mention selection competition. See
also Brainard & Dirlam, Antitrust, Regulation, and the Insurance Industry: A Study in
Polarity, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 235, 236 (1966) (commenting on "paucity of research" on
competition in insurance markets and review of past studies).
314. Kemp, supra note 33.
315. Id. at 555.
316. See Williams, supra note 111, at 216 (stating that the problems of price and
product proliferation are "more serious problems in insurance than in other businesses
because price and quality comparisons are more difficult to make") (quoting the observa-
tion of F. CRANE, AuToMOBILE INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 82 (1962)). See also sources
cited in Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination, supra note 31, at 531 n.125.
317. This is also referred to as "reverse competition." Kemp, supra note 33, at 563-
64.
318. At the 1980 Senate Hearings on the Metzenbaum bill, J. Robert Hunter, a for-
mer Deputy Federal Insurance Administrator who is now head of the National Insurance
Consumer's Organization, gave the example of a leading automobile insurance writer's
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Risk selection, the attempt to enhance competitive position by
choosing more good risks than one's competitor, is the fourth
type of competition.1 9 Insurance and credit are among the rare
enterprises that compete by selection of customers.32 0 Concen-
tration on risk selection encourages the insurance industry to
spend considerable resources on risk classification and deflects
scrutiny from other possible ways to compete. 21
The selection competition feature probably causes people to
most immediately make the analogy of insurance and credit
classifications to civil rights laws. Those unable to purchase the
product can easily see themselves as "discriminated" against.
The federal government has seen fit to forbid the use of race,
religion, sex, marital status, and national origin classification in
credit.322
It sometimes is argued that the market will correct for overly
conservative decisions in risk selection because a smart competi-
tor will change his classification system to reduce costs to the
overcharged group.2 3 This is not as likely to happen in insur-
ance as in other industries.324 The incentives in insurance under-
policy offered in the District of Columbia at $200 more than the assigned risk plan.
Hunter said that, despite the price, this policy was purchased by many people because
agents steered customers to it despite its greater expense. Senate Hearings on S. 2474,
supra note 19, at 11.
319. Kemp, supra note 33, at 555, 563; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE NAT'L COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 240-
43 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L CoMM.]; N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1063-67;
Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., supra
note 21, at 214-22 (testimony of J. Robert Hunter, Deputy Federal Insurance
Administrator).
320. Professor Works comments that "a large service industry that insists on select-
ing to whom it will sell at the consumer level is not a familiar phenomenon." Works,
supra note 20, at 456-57.
321. The president of a major insurance brokerage firm used a personal anecdote to
illustrate this phenomenon. He recounted having turned in a paper on "Underwriting the
Expense Dollar" in a night course on Large Commercial Risk Underwriting given by the
College of Insurance. The company for which he worked tried to make a five percent
profit in the liability business by keeping losses to 47 % of premiums, and expenses to
48%. In his paper, he questioned "the logic of training underwriters to spend 100% of
their effort trying to forecast losses, which are unknowable in any event, and zero time
trying to assess expenses on an individual risk basis, even though they accounted for the
larger dollar outlay and were not only knowable but controllable." His comment on the
attitude of the industry was: "Obviously I earned a grade of 'D' for the course, along with
the comment that the paper constituted impertinent criticism, while failing to demon-
strate any assimilation of what had been taught." (Speech by Robert Clements, Presi-
dent of Marsh and McLennan, Inc., before the Casualty Actuarial Society (May 12, 1980)
reprinted as Risk in a Complex Society, 1980 INs. L.J. 392, 392).
322. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982).
323. Benston, Economics of Gender Discrimination, supra note 31, at 529; see also
authorities cited in Austin, supra note 11, at 553 n.228.
324. Works suggests several explanations for the failure of the property insurance
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writing are for avoiding loss, not for taking risks on insureds
about whom there is some question. 25 An insurer's ratemaking
depends on the assumption that he is insuring homogeneous
risks whose loss record will approximate the loss record of the
sample for whom loss data is available. Picking out a new sub-
class raises uncertainty about their losses, an uncertainty insur-
ers usually seek to avoid.
3 26
Competition has not been successful in minimizing the cost of
delivering the insurance product. In testimony before a Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee in 1980, former Deputy Federal Insur-
ance Administrator J. Robert Hunter reviewed statistics on the
property and casualty insurance industry from 1958 to 1977.32,
They showed that for every dollar of cash income received:
forty-eight cents went to benefits, thirty-four cents for expenses,
and eighteen cents for positive cash flow into investments as
reserves.3 28 Hunter pointed out that this equaled a cost of sev-
enty cents to deliver each dollar of benefits. 29
The history of insurance regulation reveals a number of exam-
ples of resistance to proposals to increase competition in a way
that would pressure reduction of overhead costs. Insurance
agents' concern about pressure to reduce commission levels
probably was a factor in the passage of anti-rebate legislation.
330
Such legislation is still on the books in every state with regard to
insurance, 33 1 although pressure to negotiate and offer discounts
industry to reach a market-clearing equilibrium that eliminates availability problems:
"inadequacies of regulatory and rating practices inherited from an era of cartelization
and as yet only partially accommodated to the new realities of competitive insurance
markets"; "intrinsic limitations of the insurance technique when practiced by competing
insurers in an unruly world of heterogeneous property risks of uncertain independence
and questionable spread"; and "normal consequences of the uncertainty, transaction
costs, and incomplete information that characterize real markets unprotected by the sim-
plifying assumptions necessary for the elegant mechanics of economic theory." Works,
supra note 20, at 457. This is not to say that all insurers classify identically. There often
is substantial variation. It only is to suggest that there are incentives for the variation to
be less than otherwise might be assumed.
325. Id. at 467-69.
326. Id. at 459, 465-66.
327. Senate Hearings on S. 2474, supra note 19.
328. Id. at 23.
329. Id.
330. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
331. A compilation of 121 statutes from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico is on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF. An individual state may have multiple anti-
rebate statutes referring to various lines of insurance. See, e.g., M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24A, §§ 2160, 2162, 2163, 4139 (1974).
A Florida intermediate court recently held that the state's anti-rebate statute violated
the due process clause of the Florida Constitution as an unjustified exercise of the police
power because it bore no rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Dade County
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to the consumers is accepted in most other industries. 32 The
sale of life insurance through savings banks offers a cheap deliv-
ery technique, but only three states permit it and coverage lim-
its are low.333 Insurers and agents have opposed recent efforts of
banks to get into life insurance underwriting.3 34 Fictitious group
legislation, which severely limits what can be considered a
group, restricts the use of mass marketing in automobile and
property insurance.
3 6
A comprehensive analysis of anticompetitive features in state
insurance regulation schemes and the pros and cons of a change
in each is beyond the scope of this Article.336 The point here is
that far too much insurer and regulator attention has been de-
voted to selection of insureds as opposed to other features that
could lead to an overall reduction in the cost of delivering the
product.
Rather than favoring rate reduction, the industry is structured
to favor accumulation of capital beyond that needed to serve as
a reserve for losses.337 Insurers argue that investment income on
premiums is not properly a consideration in ratemaking in the
states in which government has regulatory authority for automo-
bile and property insurance rates, and states generally have ac-
cepted that contention.3 ' State methods for regulating rates
often have allowed an administrative expense factor that carries
forward the overhead of the least efficient carriers. 339 Insurance
accounting practices allow the industry to report millions of dol-
lars in "losses" when their profits in investment income still
Consumer Advocate's Office v. Department of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
332. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982), forbids anticompet-
itive discounts to intermediaries. Individual discounts are forbidden in regulated
industries.
333. Savings bank life insurance is sold in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New
York. Coverage is limited to $10,000, $53,000, and $30,000, respectively. A. TOBIAS, supra
note 9, at 238, 273.
334. Upheaval in Life Insurance, Bus. WK., June 25, 1984, at 58, 60.
335. J. WILSON & R. HUNTER, INVESTMENT INCOME AND PROFITABILITY IN PROPERTY/
CASUALTY RATEMAKING: AN INDEPENDENTr REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IN-
SURANCE COMMISSIONERS TASK FORCE ON PROFITABILITY AND INVESTMENT INCOME 52-53
(1983); DOJ REPORT, supra note 177, at 72-84.
336. See infra notes 408-14 and accompanying text. Most heavily debated is whether
to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). For its major pro-
visions, see note 58.
337. A recent book explores reasons for this in life insurance. R. KESSLER, THE LIFE
INSURANCE GAME 154-82, 249 (1985).
338. See R. HUNTER, supra note 147; J. WILSON & R. HUNTER, supra note 335, at 21-
38 (discussing state case law).
339. This phenomenon is a common characteristic of cartels and any regulated indus-
try in which rates are determined through collusive action.
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leave them with a substantial margin of gain. 40 Many insurance
companies are mutuals with no real control of officers, and no
effective pressure to distribute dividends, which are supposed to
be the mechanism for rate reduction.34'
Promoting desirable competition requires not only eliminating
barriers in the regulatory structure but also sufficient market in-
formation to enable insurance consumers to comparison shop.
4
1
Insurance contracts are notorious for incomprehensibility. Auto-
mobile and property insurance have undergone standardization,
which helps consumers to make price comparisons,4 8 but these
comparisons are difficult even in those lines.3 4 The multiplicity
of product differentiation and the complexity of figuring out ex-
actly what is being offered is most pronounced in life insur-
ance.3 4 5 A reform effort should seek better market information
to encourage consumer comparison of products and should scru-
tinize statutory barriers to competition as well as restrict selec-
tion competition through classification.
Procompetition rhetoric deflects attention from practices that
leave many Americans without needed insurance. This is partic-
ularly troublesome because the procompetitive rhetoric also
shields from scrutiny a number of anticompetitive market
conditions.3 "
340. A. TOBIAS, supra note 9, at 58, quotes a 1980 press release issued by the Insur-
ance Information Institute saying the property/casualty insurance industry suffered a
$3.04 billion underwriting loss and the J. CoM.'s observation that "despite the underwrit-
ing loss there was a $7.51 billion profit." He also cites a 1979 National Underwriter head-
line about a loss of $985 million for a period when the investment income was $4.3
billion.
341. See generally Role of the Policyholder, supra note 283 (on the way mutual com-
panies actually function).
342. DOJ REPORT, supra note 177, at 41-42.
343. Day, Changing Attitudes About Insurance Regulation, 14 FORUM 744, 750-51
(1979).
344. A Massachusetts study found that no more than 20% of agents and companies
contacted regarding property casualty insurance gave price information on the phone. J.
WILSON & R. HUNTER, supra note 335, at 59. Wilson and Hunter also discuss other stud-
ies of available consumer information. Id. at 53-62.
345. See generally Cost Disclosure in Life Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter Cost Disclosure Hearings, 96th Cong.]; R. KESS-
LER, supra note 337.
346. See testimony of Robert Hunter, then Deputy Federal Insurance Administrator,
in Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., supra
note 21, at 215, arguing that the focus should be shifted from selection competition to
competition based on "lower price, better coverage, superior service, or a combination
thereof."
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II. FROM PERSPECTIVES TO OBJECTIVES
The antidiscrimination perspective makes a valuable contribu-
tion to the debate on insurance classification by focusing on the
use of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin as classifi-
ers. 4" Once the use of these classifications is forbidden, however,
difficult questions remain: Should classifications other than
these, but having an adverse impact on the banned classifica-
tions, also be restricted? Are there additional classifications that
should be restricted as well? Should the treatment of questiona-
ble classifications other than race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin be subject to less than an absolute ban?3 48 In other words,
should a permissible defense exist?
Two of the discrimination theories developed in fair employ-
ment law have been discussed in relation to insurance. The first
is the disparate treatment theory, which refers to the treatment
of people in a protected classification differently from the way
others are treated.349 The second is the adverse impact theory,
which refers to practices that have a discriminatory effect and
disqualify members of a protected group at a substantially
higher rate than others without a showing that the requirement
imposed is job-related or a necessity.35 0
The adverse impact theory was articulated by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,3 5  which held that when
Congress prohibited race and color classification, it also in-
tended to prohibit classifications with an adverse impact on
blacks if such classifications could not be justified as a matter of
business necessity or relationship to job performance.152 Confu-
sion exists in fair employment law about whether business ne-
cessity and job relatedness are different standards and what
they require in justification. 53 Job relatedness may require only
347. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
348. For examples of state statutes imposing less than a complete ban, see supra
notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
349. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13 (2d ed. 1983). 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982) provides a bona fide occupational qualification exception
with regard to sex, religion, and national origin, but not for race or color discrimination.
350. B. SCHL.I & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 349, at 82-84, 91-92.
351. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
352. "[Title VIII proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431, quoted in B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 349, at 112.
353. B. ScHLz & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 349, at 112-14.
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that the criterion reasonably measures job performance, 354 while
business necessity has been interpreted to require a test'essen-
tial to the employer's goals of safety and efficiency.1
55
Problems arise when one considers appropriate analogies to
these tests in insurance. Intuitively, some classifications with an
adverse impact seem better than others. Convictions for driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs might have an adverse
impact on male drivers, but it seems appropriate for these classi-
fications to be used in automobile insurance. Residence zip code,
which often adversely affects racial minorities, is a considerably
more controversial automobile insurance classification than alco-
hol or drug-related convictions.
3 56
If an analogy to job relatedness meant only that the classifica-
tion be statistically justifiable, it would require no more than the
current unfair discrimination statutes. 57 Such a classification
might be subject to other charges of perceived unfairness such as
offering no plausible causal explanation.358 An appropriate anal-
ogy for business necessity in the insurance context is difficult to
draw.
The alternative proposed here would not use adverse impact
analysis or an antidiscrimination approach to consider other
classifications beyond race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Rather than focusing on how bad a classification might be, pro-
posed classifications would be judged against a set of criteria
that they affirmatively should meet.35 9 Of course, in a sense, de-
ciding whether a classification is good enough is the same as de-
ciding whether it is too bad, but the affirmative criteria pro-
posed by this Article have been formulated in specific relation to
values for an insurance classification scheme rather than ab-
stract considerations about a classification outside the insurance
context. Considerations such as relation to overall loss reduction
and available alternatives to the coverage are introduced. Such
criteria encompass consideration for values other than
discrimination.
Requiring that classifications used affirmatively meet certain
criteria means that insurance classification would be treated
more stringently than classifications in other areas such as em-
ployment and housing. In those areas of law, the primary tools
354. Id. at 113.
355. Id.
356. See supra notes 21-24 & 27 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 115-16 & 176 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 115-65 and accompanying text.
359. See infra notes 398-404 and accompanying text.
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restricting the decisionmaker's choice are the antidiscrimination
prohibitions of specified classifications. Generally, once banned
classifications and any others reached under an adverse impact
theory are avoided, the employer or landlord may apply
whatever arbitrary or discriminatory criteria he or she pleases. If
one wishes to refuse to rent an apartment to people who ride
motorcycles or sell antiques, one may do so.3s 0
I have argued in this Article that there should be a special
concern for the perceived legitimacy of classifications in insur-
ance because of the necessity of the product and the public
choices to meet that need through the private sector. 36' The ne-
cessity of insurance and the public decision to meet the need
through private insurance, however, do not explain why an ap-
proach that is more stringent than that taken in employment or
housing discrimination law should be used. Employment and
housing are certainly as important to people as insurance.
An approach to classifications that is more stringent in insur-
ance than employment or housing has several justifications.
First, classifications in insurance already are treated more strin-
gently, reflecting a previously made social judgment. Such re-
striction occurs in the unfair discrimination statutes.6 2 Some in-
surance commissioners have tried to argue that most of the
criteria proposed by this Article363 can be applied through inter-
pretation of the term unfair discrimination.36 '
Another justification lies in the much greater likelihood that
all insurers will use the same classification than that all employ-
ers or all landlords will do so. There usually are many more em-
ployers, landlords, or house sellers than insurers offering a par-
ticular coverage in a particular locale.
Third, the insurance industry's antitrust exemption3 6 5 permits
insurers to pool statistical data on loss and to use a central rate
bureau's classification plan.3 66 Insurers also frequently ask if an
applicant has been turned down or "rated up" by another car-
360. Discretion in rentals is sometimes limited by rent control statutes as well as by
fair housing laws.
361. See supra notes 250-311 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
363. See infra notes 398-99 and accompanying text.
364. See the decision of Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner James Stone, supra
note 149, the decision of New Jersey Insurance Commissioner James Sheeran, supra note
27, and cases overruling decisions of Florida, Louisiana, and North Carolina Commis-
sioners cited in supra note 35.
365. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982) (McCarran-Ferguson Act).
366. J. WILSON & R. HUNTER, supra note 335, at 54-57. For information on how the
property/casualty industry is organized and functions, see generally DOJ REPORT, supra
note 177.
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rier. An affirmative answer often leads to a repetition of the pre-
vious treatment.
367
Finally, insurers are concerned that their sample of insureds
reflect the same distribution of risks as the sample of risks for
whom loss data is available. This discourages taking different
approaches to classification.36 8 The incentives for agents and un-
derwriters are to avoid loss rather than to discover people who
have been refused wrongly or charged too much by other
insurers.69
Three possible objectives for regulation of classification are:
370
perceived fairness of the system and legitimacy of classifications
used, promotion of overall loss control, and encouragement of
desirable competition.
3 7 1
Almost all discussions of goals in insurance regulation begin
with solvency. 7 2 Although no scheme for classification regula-
tion should threaten solvency, however, classification regulation
367. Senate Hearings on S. 2474, supra note 19, at 3.
368. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text.
369. Id.
370. For the perspective of an insurance trade association on objectives for a risk
classification system, see Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and
Casualty Ins., supra note 21, at 102.
371. In THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970), Guido
Calabresi posits goals and subgoals for judging a system of accident law and attendant
compensation systems. His concern is with accident law generally, with private insurance
as a part of some of the alternative schemes considered, rather than risk classification
alone, but the following shows some parallels in his concerns and those described here.
Calabresi's primary goals for a system of accident law are reduction of accident costs
and justice. Id. at 24-33. Reduction of accident costs is divided into three subgoals. The
primary subgoal, reduction in number and severity of accidents, parallels the loss control
goal described here. Id. at 26-27. The secondary subgoal is reducing the.societal cost of
accidents, as distinguished from their number and severity, which he says could be ac-
complished through risk spreading or in placing costs on those most able to pay. Id. at
27-28. The optimal type and degree of risk spreading for particular coverages are not
addressed in this Article although more risk spreading and cost reduction through com-
petitive pressures on administrative costs rather than risk selection are advocated. Gov-
ernment action with regard to particular coverages should be considered in light of the
results of the proposed availability study, the available alternatives to the coverage, and
incentives for overall loss reduction in various schemes. Calabresi's tertiary subgoal is
"efficiency cost reduction," whether particular methods of achieving other subgoals are
worth their administrative cost. Id. at 28. I argue that concentration on risk selection as
a mode of competition has obscured inefficiencies in the delivery of insurance protection.
Calabresi treats justice as a constraint or check, "a final test which any system of
accident law must pass," rather than as an initial consideration for a system of accident
law. Id. at 24-26. He does so because he sees difficulty in recognizing justice and greater
ease in recognizing injustice. Id. at 24 n.2. The goal proposed here for classification regu-
lation is perceived fairness and legitimacy rather than a particular definition of justice.
The reforms advocated are designed to shift responsibility for classification into the pub-
lic debate and to assign government responsibility for final decisions on classifications.
372. J. DAY, ECONoMIc REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1970).
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is not a tool for achieving the goal. 7s
The first objective proposed for classification regulation is
that classification systems be perceived as fair and that classifi-
cations used be perceived as legitimate. This does not mean
abandoning statistical association with loss as a consideration in
insurance classification, because it has a strong perception of
fairness and legitimacy associated with it. In fact, insurance reg-
ulators should be more aggressive about scrutinizing whether
proposed classifications are associated with loss on the basis of
valid data,37' but the inquiry should not end there. The question
of statistical accuracy should require more than the mere pres-
ence of a difference in averages among groups that insurers have
defined. The statistical separation of the groups created from
the rest of the population is important as well.
3 75
Perceived fairness and legitimacy also suggest that there be a
perceived plausible causal linkage.3 7 1 In mathematical and scien-
tific theory, causation can never be known.3 7 7 At the same time,
the perception that causation is plausible is important. Further-
more, plausible causal explanations provide hypotheses about
how loss can be avoided. 8
Social acceptability is another measure of perceived legitimacy
and fairness. Race, color, religion, sex, and national origin score
badly on it.379 Including social acceptability in the definition of
perceived fairness and legitimacy for insurance classification fo-
cuses on how bad a classification is in the manner for which the
antidiscrimination perspective has been criticized. Here, how-
373. See Testimony of J. Robert Hunter, then Deputy Federal Insurance Administra-
tor, now Director of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, Senate Oversight
Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Casualty Ins., supra note 21, at 219:
As an actuary I believe that any plan can be actuarially sound in terms of
achieving the end result which is a reasonable profit for insurers .... [Y]ou can
eliminate age, sex, and even territory and take a map of the State and compile
the number of dollars you want to collect at various levels and do it through
merit rating or whatever approach you want to use.
Of course, almost any plan is actuarially sound. The actuaries did not create
most of the classification slots in use today anyway. They were created by under-
writers based in many cases on prejudgments.
In 1977 the Department of Justice recommended that a federal system with a uniform
system of solvency regulation emphasizing early detection and prompt removal of weak
companies would be preferable to the common state approach of "keeping every insurer
afloat." DOJ REPORT, supra note 177, at ix. It recommended a guaranty fund, like the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to provide policyholder security. Id.
374. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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ever, social acceptability is one of several criteria against which
classifications are to be judged. The other criteria have been es-
tablished specifically with regard to the nature of the insurance
enterprise.
The second objective for judging a classification system is the
relationship of classification to an overall system of loss con-
trol.380 If a classification creates incentives to reduce losses, all
insureds can gain in life, health, and disability insurance. A non-
smokers' classification creates incentives not to smoke. Less ill-
ness and fewer premature deaths can reduce the cost of health,
disability, and life insurance for everyone. In contrast, sex classi-
fication creates no incentives because there are no measures one
can take to be classified differently.
The third objective is the stimulation of desirable competi-
tion. Government should act to encourage a shift from selection
competition toward competition that will create pressure for
lower overall price levels, better service, and more valuable
products.381 The focus should not be on competition as an end in
itself but on its ability to produce these desirable ends.
Availability does not appear on the list of objectives. Given
the critical nature of insurance, availability should be a more
important concern than the three listed objectives. The omission
occurs because perceived fairness and legitimacy, encouraging
loss control, and promotion of desirable competition are pro-
posed as short-term reforms for a system of insurance classifica-
tion regulation, not a long-term approach to insurance regula-
tion generally.382 In a longer term scheme, society might decide
to close availability gaps with mechanisms that de-emphasize
one of the previously stated objectives such as competition.
The antidiscrimination perspective, although important for
other reasons,38 3 deflects attention from availability by its con-
centration on restricting the use of particular classifications. Re-
striction of classification discretion usually will lead to greater
availability for some people. If sex classification in automobile
insurance is forbidden, one can expect that at least some young
men will pay less for insurance. This presumably means that
380. Denenberg has suggested this as an appropriate criterion. Denenberg, supra
note 260, at 216; see also Underwood, supra note 33, at 1437-42 (discussing appropriate-
ness of "predictors that induce, reward, and punish"); G. CALABRnsi, supra note 371, at
26-27.
381. See supra notes 312-46 and accompanying text.
382. The inclusion of "the alternatives to private insurance coverage available to po-
tential insureds" as a consideration in my suggested criteria for classifiers assigns some
weight to availability. See infra notes 398-400 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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some for whom insurance was previously unaffordable will now
be able to purchase it. At the same time, the cost probably will
go up for some young women. If the increase is substantial, it
may render insurance unaffordable to them.
Estimating the redistribution of cost and the changes in avail-
ability likely to result from restricting the use of a particular
classification is complicated, because the cost shifts may be
moderated considerably if alternative classifications are used.3 8
If gender classification is banned in automobile insurance and no
other classification is substituted, there will be a considerable
redistribution in cost and probably in availability.8 5 On the
other hand, it has been argued that there would be little change
if mileage were to be substituted."'
Classification restriction is only one way to change availability
patterns. 387 External public subsidies or rate adjustments that
distribute the cost among the group perceived to be a higher risk
are other alternatives. These general approaches can be com-
bined in addressing a specific availability issue. There are a host
of variations in how such schemes might work, including varia-
tions in the roles government and private insurers play.
III. FROM OBJECTIVES TO REFORMS
The ban on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin classi-
fication found in both the Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell and the
Metzenbaum bills should be enacted by Congress for all the per-
sonal lines of insurance. Congress should act in three additional
areas as well.
First, the crucial place of insurance in the society38 8 and the
ways risk selection can deflect pressure from price and service
competition should dictate a public role in approval of all classi-
fications used in rating, underwriting, and coverage3 89 This Arti-
cle proposes criteria against which rating classifications should
be judged. These would be combined with limitations on under-
writing and coverage discretion. Written findings on whether a
384. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAIR INSURANCE
PRACTICES ACT 19-23 (1984).
385. Id. at 21.
386. House Hearings on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra note 26, at 403; Senate Hear-
ings on S. 372, supra note 26, at 184.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 308-11.
388. See supra notes 251-311 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 312-46 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 19:2
Insurance Classification
prior rating classification meets the criteria would be made by
state officials after an administrative process open to public
comment. Consumers denied insurance would be entitled to
written notice of reasons, with appeal rights to a state adminis-
trative agency.
Second, a national study of insurance availability in the per-
sonal lines should be conducted to determine who is uninsured,
why, and whether there are coverage alternatives for such peo-
ple. The results of this study would provide data and focus na-
tional attention on whether there should be public initiatives to
increase availability. Such initiatives might include further re-
strictions on classification or might take another approach such
as public subsidy.
Third, reforms should be enacted to enhance desirable compe-
tition. Federal requirements for the production and distribution
of consumer information on policy prices and terms should be
set. As a stimulus to service competition, state regulators also
should be required to make available data on consumer com-
plaints about insurer practices, such as claims settlement and
their disposition. In addition to enhancing consumer informa-
tion, laws regulating insurance should be scrutinized for an-
ticompetitive features.
All of these steps should be taken by Congress even though
state insurance regulators would retain responsibility for imple-
mentation under the standards set by the federal legislation.
While it has been clear since 1944 that the federal government
has the authority to regulate insurance,390 this authority rarely
has been exercised. Unlike the dearth of discussion about the
nature of the insurance enterprise, the practices that should be
regulated, and the ends that regulation should seek to address,
the question of who should regulate insurance has received con-
siderable attention. 91 Without reviewing that debate, this Arti-
cle proposes an increased federal role for the following reasons.
390. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., Kimball, State versus Federal Regulation in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT
AND SOCIAL POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE REGULATION 411 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg
eds. 1969); Belkin, State Regulation: Anachronism or Advantage, 29 FED'N INS. COUNS.
Q. 209 (1979); Hanson, The Interplay of the Regimes of Antitrust, Competition and
State Insurance Regulation in the Business of Insurance, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 767 (1978-
1979); Potential Federal Intervention in the Insurance Industry: The Pending United
States Senate Subcommittee Draft to Amend the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 28 DRAKE L.
REV. 926 (1978-1979); Johnson, Insurance Regulation at the Crossroads, 1977 INS. L.J. 7;
McCallion, Introductory Remarks: Panels on Issues of Federal and State Regulation of
Insurance, 13 FORUM 603 (1978); Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for
Procompetitive Reform, 29 V~AD. L. REV. 1271 (1976).
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First, reform efforts in individual states frequently have been
frustrated by insurers' threats of withdrawal, or even actual
withdrawal, from doing business in the state. 92 Second, it has
proven difficult for state regulators to withstand the political
pressure that can be exerted by insurers.3 93 Third, because so
much insurance business is done across state lines, state regula-
tors are often no match for large national and international in-
surers. 94 Fourth, to divert competitive efforts in selection com-
petition to more desirable forms of competition, all insurers
must be required to play according to the same rules. Finally,
the proposed study of availability would require considerable re-
sources and should look at availability concerns nationwide.
The proposal takes the Metzenbaum bill's structural approach
of banning some classifications and giving state regulators au-
thority to make judgments about other classifications. A small
federal office would be charged with collecting data on state reg-
ulation, acting as a clearinghouse to make the states' procedures
and decisions available to each other, and evaluating state ac-
tions after two years. The results of that study may suggest that
more federal preemption is warranted. On the other hand, this
federal and state sharing of authority may produce desirable ex-
perimentation, adaptation to state differences in circumstances,
or other desirable results. The study should recommend modifi-
cations in the statutory framework if they are deemed
appropriate.
A. Standards for Classification
Race, color, religion, sex, and national origin classification
should be banned in all the personal lines of insurance.395 Both
392. For historical examples, see H. GRANT, supra note 181, at 60 (Wisconsin), 64
(Texas), 119 (Missouri); Works, supra note 20, at 479 n.75 (citing S. KIMBALL, supra note
119, at 171, 243, 273, 276, 284).
393. Grant provides a historical example with regard to the New York legislature.
From 1900 to 1905, New York Life alone paid Andrew Hamilton more than $475,000 "to
act for the company in matters relating to taxation and legislation." H. GRANT, supra
note 181, at 41. Sharp reports a million dollar advertising and direct mail campaign
launched against the Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell bill. Sharp, supra note 166, at 234 &
n.38.
394. This is particularly acute now that insurance companies are large multistate en-
tities that are often part of even larger corporate conglomerates. Former Pennsylvania
Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg has commented that state regulators are
"ill-equipped to keep up with the likes of Litton, Gulf & Western, and Teledyne."
Denenberg, supra note 260, at 219.
395. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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the Hatfield-Packwood-Dingel13 96  and Metzenbaum bills39 '
would ban these classifications, although the Metzenbaum bill
would do so only for automobile and property insurance. State
insurance regulators should be required to approve all rating
classifications used and the maximum that standard rates could
be varied based on such classifications. In doing so, they should
give substantial weight to, and make findings on, the following
criteria:398
A) the statistical power of the characteristic's predic-
tion of loss;
396. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
398. The Metzenbaum bill proposed as criteria:
(A) the compatibility of the use of the characteristic by which the grouping is
defined with widely held social values;
(B) the degree of incentive created by the use of such characteristic for the
reduction and retention of losses by individual insureds;
(C) the degree to which such characteristic is causally linked to likelihood of
loss and controllable by individual insureds;
(D) the accuracy of pricing which results for each individual insured so
grouped;
(E) the homogeneity with respect to potential for loss which results from the
use of the grouping; and
(F) the degree of statistical separation of the grouping of insureds from the
remainder of the insured population which results from the use of the
category.
S. 2474, supra note 104, at § 6(c)(2), 126 Cong. Rec. 6531 (1980).
My criterion A seeks to achieve some of the same ends as Metzenbaum's D criterion
(accuracy of pricing for each insured), but Metzenbaum's wording suggests homogeneity
as a criterion. Metzenbaum's criterion E specifically requires consideration for homoge-
neity. Because I wish to open the possibility of broader rather than narrower classifica-
tions, homogeneity has been rejected as a criterion. See Abraham, supra note 33, at 410-
11, 417-19, arguing that separability is the proper statistical concern rather than homo-
geneity, which he terms a fairness consideration.
The wording of my B criterion, statistical separation, is identical to Metzenbaum's
criterion F. See Abraham, supra note 33, at 410-11, regarding separability as a criterion
for classification.
My criterion C refers to causality, as does Metzenbaum's criterion C. My wording is
preferable because it recognizes that causation cannot be "known" while acknowledging
the value of causation to perceived legitimacy.
My criterion D is similar to Metzenbaum's criterion B in emphasizing incentives to
reduce the loss. "Reduction in number or cost of losses" has been substituted for "reduc-
tion and retention of losses."
My criterion E introduces controllability addressed by Metzenbaum in his criterion C.
Criterion F is identical to Metzenbaum's criterion A. My G, alternatives available, in-
troduces a value considered by Metzenbaum and suggested by this Article's analysis of
the place of insurance in the society.
Other criteria with some similarities to this Article's criteria were developed in a Flor-
ida state study. See Senate Oversight Hearings on Discrimination in Property and Cas-
ualty Ins., supra note 21, at 791; see also statement of criteria by the New Jersey Insur-
ance Commission, N.J. Overview, supra note 127, at 1104, and the list of criteria
developed by Commercial United Ins. Co., Senate Hearings on S. 2204, supra note 26, at
121.
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B) the degree of statistical separation of the grouping
of insureds from the remainder of the insured popu-
lation which results from the use of the category;
399
C) whether the characteristic's relation to loss can be
supported by a persuasive causal explanation;
D) the degree of incentive created by the use of such
characteristic in rating for reduction in number or
cost of losses;
E) the degree to which the classification is controllable
by individual insureds;
F) the compatibility with widely held social values of
the use of the characteristic by which the grouping
is defined; and
G) the alternatives to private insurance coverage that
are available to potential insureds who cannot get
this insurance.
State insurance regulators would be required to give weight to,
and make written findings on, each of these criteria, but would
be permitted to approve classifications for which there was little
evidence, or even some negative evidence, on one or more crite-
ria. The legislative history should make clear the recognition
that regulators are to weigh values reflected by the criteria, and
that these values often will be in conflict. The weighing process
may result in approval of a classification that scores poorly in
some regards with the weakness on one or more criteria reflected
in a moderation of the rate differential for the classification
rather than a ban on its use.
Criteria A and B retain statistical accuracy as a value but with
a more precise statement of what is to be considered than "un-
fair discrimination" looking only to group average. Criterion C
goes to causation as an important factor in the perceived legiti-
macy of classifications. Criteria D through G explicitly introduce
values other than statistical accuracy into the process of approv-
ing classifications: incentives for loss control, controllability by
the insured, compatibility with widely held social values, and
coverage alternatives.
A number of terms in these criteria are open to varying inter-
pretations. Determinations about persuasive causal explanation,
widely held social values, and available alternatives all are likely
to be hotly debated and to vary from state to state. Empirical
evidence on how controllable are such characteristics as obesity
399. See Abraham, supra note 33, at 410-11.
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and smoking may generate controversy. Whether not driving at
all is an acceptable alternative to high insurance rates may de-
pend on the age and locality of the potential drivers involved.
The point of adoption of classification standards is to make cri-
teria explicit and expose debate on them to the public.4 0
The Metzenbaum bill's restrictions on the use of classifica-
tions in underwriting and coverage decisions"0 1 also should be
adopted and extended to all the personal lines of insurance.
Under the bill, insurers could only cancel, fail to renew, or refuse
to make a coverage available for: nonpayment, policyholder
fraud, a suspended or revoked license in auto insurance, "unin-
surability" of the insured, or if the state Commissioner deter-
mined that the insurer's capacity had been exhausted. 02 Insur-
ers would be required to notify an insured or applicant of the
reason for negative action. 0 3 Insureds would be entitled to re-
400. Austin, supra note 11, at 558 and authority cited in n.257, questions whether
values can be balanced when they are viewed as being subjective. There likely will be
disagreement about a commissioner's assessment and weighing of the criteria. The rec-
ommended written statement of his reasoning should expose it for public debate.
401. S. 2474, supra note 104, § 6(b), 126 CONG. REc. at 6531. See infra notes 402-04
for provisions.
402. S. 2474, supra note 104, § 6(b)(1), 126 CONG. REC. at 6531 (emphasis added):
(1) No insurer may cancel, fail to renew (at the policyholder's option), or
refuse to make available to any applicant, in conformance with the same
rates, rules, and terms applied to its other policyholders insured with
comparable coverage, any included coverage which it generally provides,
except for any of the following reasons or conditions:
(A) Nonpayment of premiums after reasonable notice.
(B) Fraud or material misrepresentation in the application for insurance
or renewal thereof or in the filing of a claim.
(C) In the case of private passenger motor vehicle insurance, if the oper-
ator's license or motor vehicle registration of the applicant, named
insured, or any other person covered under the application or policy.
is under suspension or revocation at the time of cancellation, nonre-
newal, or application.
(D) If the applicant or insured is not an insurable risk.
(E) If the insurer which refuses coverage has been found by the commis-
sioner of the State in which such refusal occurs to have exhausted
its capital capacity to write any new policies providing included cov-
erages and has been ordered not to write any such policies.
Although "uninsurability," § 6(b)(1)(D), is an imprecise and undefined term, the re-
quirements for reasons and review should provide sufficient safeguards. See infra notes
403 & 404 and accompanying text.
403. S. 2474, supra note 104, § 6(b)(2)-(3), 126 CONG. REc. at 6531:
(2) Any cancellation or non-renewal notice issued by an insurer shall state
specifically and fully the reason or reasons for such cancellation or nonrenewal.
(3) Any insurer which refuses to issue a policy providing any included cover-
age shall provide any applicant therefor with timely notice of the refusal to in-
sure, including a specific and full statement of the reason or reasons for such
refusal.
An additional phrase, "including the grounds for a determination of uninsurability,"
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view of such decisions by a state official.40 4
One additional requirement should be added to the Metzen-
baum approach. Insurers should be required to develop written
standards for uninsurability that must be on file with state in-
surance commissions and available to the public. Insurance com-
missioners should be given the authority to require changes in
such standards. Otherwise, the uninsurability label could be
used to subvert what otherwise might have been achieved by
classification regulation.
B. Availability Study
Legislation should establish a national commission to design
and take responsibility for an inventory of insurance availability
at the time reform legislation is passed and two years after its
implementation. 40 5 This study should examine the availability of
all important coverages in the personal lines of insurance. It
should attempt to isolate the characteristics of people for whom
rates are particularly high and for whom a specific coverage can-
not be purchased at all.
The design of the commission, including such issues as mem-
bership, staffing, and funding, should reflect concern for at least
three factors. First, adequate resources to design and institute a
study of this scope must be provided. A number of studies of
particular lines and classifications exist.406 These should be in-
ventoried, a design for collecting information then must be de-
vised, and steps must be taken to gather the data.
Second, cooperation between existing federal government
agencies and the commission must be a concern. Much impor-
tant data probably exists already within the government.
should be added to the end of § 6(b)(2)-(3) to make clear that the statement "applicant
is uninsurable" is insufficient.
404. S. 2474, supra note 104, § 6(b)(4), 126 CONG. REC. at 6531:
(4) Any insured or applicant who receives notice of a refusal to insure, cancella-
tion, or nonrenewal shall be entitled to review thereof by an appropriate State
official.
This section should be amended to require the insurer to notify the insured of the right
to such an appeal and the procedures to be followed along with the reasons for action
required to be disclosed by § 6(b)(2)-(3). See supra note 403.
405. Some critics of Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell have predicted that availability
problems will result from the elimination of sex classification. See, e.g., House Hearings
on H.R. 100, 98th Cong., supra note 26, at 663-64 (statement of the Health Insurance
Association of America). Such predictions should be tested.
406. For example, see authorities cited in supra note 21 and the study discussed in
Faulted on Health Care, supra note 294.
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Surveys that are routinely done by government agencies might
be vehicles for gathering information.
Third, the commission should be designed to assure that its
findings receive wide public exposure and attention at the high-
est levels of the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment. This is necessary to compel attention to availability gaps
in insurance, whether these gaps should be closed, who should
pay for broader coverage deemed desirable, and what mecha-
nisms should be used to achieve this greater availability.
C. Promoting Competition in the Insurance Market
The Metzenbaum bill proposed shopping guides and readabil-
ity standards for automobile and property insurance.0 7 Such
guides and standards should be required for all the personal
lines of insurance. Designing a format for disclosure in life insur-
ance is more complex than for the other lines,'0 8 but should be
done. The adoption of a uniform system of disclosure akin to
that required for credit by Truth-in-Lending' 0 9 should be con-
sidered. Such consumer information is designed to stimulate
competition in price and services. Insurance regulators should
also be required to compile statistics on consumer complaints
about particular companies and their disposition of those com-
plaints and make this information available to the public. Such
information would allow consumers to take service better into
account in making shopping decisions.
Consideration of reform legislation should include hearings on
features of federal and state legislation that have been called an-
ticompetitive. The Metzenbaum bill proposed repeal of McCar-
ran-Ferguson antitrust immunity,' 0 and hearings on such a re-
peal were held recently by a House Judiciary Subcommittee. 1
Several features of state legislation should be considered for fed-
eral prohibition or modification. These include anti-rebate stat-
407. S. 2474, supra note 104, §§ 7, 9, 126 CONG. REC. at 6531. Former Pennsylvania
Insurance Commissioner Herbert Denenberg has testified that "Shopper's Guides" pub-
lished by that state "had more impact on the companies and the market than much of
the more conventional regulatory action." Senate Hearings on S. 2477, supra note 26, at
133.
408. See generally Cost Disclosure Hearings, supra note 345.
409. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1985).
410. S. 2474, supra note 104, § 3, 126 CONG. REc. at 6530.
411. Houle Oversight Hearings, supra note 10.
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utes, ' 1 2 fictitious group legislation, 413 and restrictions on sale of
insurance through entities like banks." 4
CONCLUSION
Insurance classification has been the subject of much public
debate. The traditional fair discriminators' perspective that ad-
ditional government regulation of classification discretion would
do violence to a venerable, fair system has little merit. The con-
clusion from the antidiscrimination perspective that race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin classifications should be prohib-
ited is a sound one but does not provide useful criteria for con-
sidering the use of other classifiers. The antidiscrimination per-
spective's domination of public debate and proposed reforms
also obscures what should be a primary concern to the society:
availability of the personal lines of insurance.
The classification debate should be viewed from two perspec-
tives that have not received sufficient attention. These are the
importance of insurance to Americans and the anticompetitive
aspects of the insurance market. Given the importance of the
needs that insurance meets and the public choice to meet those
needs through private insurers, society should not cede to insur-
ers' complete discretion in classifying people when the effect is
to determine who can be covered and at what price. The federal
government should establish appropriate criteria against which
classifications are scrutinized. More important, society should
examine the availability patterns that result from existing classi-
fication practices including changes that may occur in those pat-
terns after prohibitions on the use of race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin are put in place. This availability study and
the publication of its results should be done in the manner most
likely to require the public and their elected representatives to
confront the issue of which gaps in availability will be tolerated
and which should be closed by government action.
Procompetition rhetoric has been used to shield classification
discretion from restriction. Uncritical acceptance of "competi-
tion not regulation" sloganeering ignores the special features of
the insurance market and the way competition operates within
it. Competition is valuable only insofar as it promotes lower
prices, efficient service, innovation, and new or improved prod-
ucts and distribution methods. Restricting competition through
412. See supra notes 183-206 & 330-31 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
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classification should pressure insurers to compete in ways likely
to achieve these ends. Regulators also should assure that con-
sumers can get useful information about competing products.
Legal barriers to competition should be scrutinized for possible
repeal.
Insurance classification is a matter of great consequence to
most Americans and to society generally. It is too important to
be left to the actuaries.

